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Introduction - Perspectives. 
Approach. Approaches to law that are evolving in a sequence of ambiguous, 
dynamic situations vary according to the purposes of inquiry.! McDougal and 
his associates have led us to fruitful inquiry by advising that regardless of the 
tactics of approach, the most productive viewpoint is that of the detached 
observer. This vantage point provides us with distance from law whose prescrip-
tive strength is tentative. It enables us objectively to sort out the claims among 
contending prospects for rule in those situations where the certain decisions to 
be treated as law are still in stiff competition with the claims of policy. This 
situation prevails with economic warfare where the vague but telling claims of 
policy, like those of "necessity" or in the vernacular of" extenuating circumstan-
ces," are readily raised. States from time immemorial have resorted to fashioning 
and using strategic instruments of policy, so that it comes as no surprise that the 
economic instrument used in belligerency will be accompanied by diplomatic 
and ideological as well as military instruments.2 
Klaus Knorr provides a background to the position taken in this paper? When 
modem belligerent states practice economic warfare, 
they seek to reduce each other's economic base of military (and economic) power 
relative to their own. In these cases, economic warfare supplements military action 
as a means to coerce or simply to overwhelm or resist an adversary. But the 
immediate purpose of economic warfare is then not coercive. It is rather to weaken 
the economic foundation of the enemy's power. Military action can, of course, 
be applied toward destroying the economic sinews of the opponent's military 
strength. Naval blockades can sever trade, and bombing from the air and sabotage 
on the ground can destroy factories, shipyards, rail transport, etc. [pp. 133-134]. 
Knorr concludes: 
In practice, the effectiveness of economic warfare is difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure, since the economic policies involved are usually only one factor, and 
certainly not the weightiest, in determining the outcome of war. Regarding 
World War II, economic warfare hardly caused the downfall of Germany and 
Japan, though it contributed to their eventual collapse. And the contribution it 
265 Almond 
did make surely resulted overwhelmingly from military measures of economic 
warfare, from naval blockade, and especially, in the case of Germany, from aerial 
bombardment.4 
The processes of claim, applicable alike to firming policy and law, are 
operative in state practice during peace and belligerency.5 Such processes actively 
lead to the expected patterns of behavior in warfare.6 They have been notably 
affected by changing attitudes and expectations, changing tolerances, regarding 
the targets and acceptable destruction of hostilities, and in that sense alone they 
have led to law that has had a humanitarian character and moderating effect. But 
from the mid-19th Century, and particularly in recent years, state practice has 
introduced directly the humanitarian concern with non-combatants. Because so 
much of this concern has led to new law, and because belligerency itself through 
state practice is the determinative arena in which new law is applied, the extent 
to which such moderation has an impact in the law-making sense must await 
future hostilities. 
Accordingly, a variety of approaches can be considered for an inquiry into 
economic warfare at this time? Following McDougal it can be comprehensive, 
and for present purposes, the comprehensive approach already taken by Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano will be taken as sufficient.8 Approaches may in a sense be 
an attempt at codification, where the inquiry seeks to refine or increase the body 
of hard law, or it may be concerned with general principles, or operational in 
the sense that direct "hands-on" advice is proposed to the audience. The 
approach taken here draws on the operational factor, but is aimed at a primary 
point of assessment: the inquiry is directly concerned with whether we are 
witnessing trends, substantially revived during the second World War, of 
attacking the entire economy of a nation as a strategic, and legitimate, target of 
warfare.9 This trend is bolstered by the recent desert war against Iraq - the attack 
was launched against the political and working infrastructure of the nation to 
bring about a quick termination to the fighting, and this meant attacks on targets 
that were essential to the economy as a whole as well as to the economy of war 
fighting.1o Once the target of economic war is the economy, then the measures 
of economic warfare tend to be blurred, combining the traditional use of economic 
measures and military measuresY At least part of this trend was signalled by the 
advancing military technology, and the appearance of submarine warfare. 12 
Perspectives. The traditional instruments of war are designed to coerce others 
by force or threats to resort to force through arms. The legal regulation of the 
use of force and of military forces in particular expressed as the law of war is 
notable for general principles that leave open the emergence oflaw consistent 
with the tolerances of states as to what they accept as legally permissible. 
While this inquiry addresses economic warfare particularly during the bel-
ligerency of states, the grand strategy within which economic instruments are 
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used to advance policy ultimately must govem.13 A nation without long-tenn 
goals and perspectives concerning the future of global order stands to suffer and 
ultimately to decline. A democratic state handicapped by leaders that lack 
strategic vision and are caught up in the rough and tumble of domestic politics 
is not readily attuned to the elements of strategy, let alone its critical vocabulary. 
The fundamental elements of policy that is dependent upon coercion, lodged 
in deception, surprise, and the manipulation of the participants in policy have 
their counterparts both in times of "war" and "peace", but the resort to these 
factors, even the resort to covert warfare, is often repugnant to the democratic 
perspective. Uncertainties over the balance of power and its cultivation, and 
over equilibrium associated with the element of "peace" are aggravated by such 
a state in its democratic processes. Because the fonnulation and promotion of a 
grand strategy is so difficult, the recourse to economic warfare as an instrument 
of policy or strategy tends toward a policy vacuum. But this it seems must be 
d . 14 accepte as a gIven. 
The conduct of warfare amounts to a resort to intense coercion, and among 
the modalities that have emerged are the attacks that are strategic in nature, aimed 
at the economies as well as the traditional attacks aimed at the economic activities 
of an enemy. Anned force symbolizing capability to exert power, capacity to 
defend, and even in threat, intention to influence is the familiar military 
instrument, intended to exert coercion of high intensity, and expected to achieve 
military and political objectives. Hence economic warfare is likely to be 
accompanied by anned force or conducted in parallel with the use of anned 
force. 
Traditionally, economic warfare imposed through naval forces has relied on 
blockade, and found it effective in bringing an earlier termination to the war.1S 
With the rise of strategic weapons and the tolerances among states relating to 
strategic warfare appearing in the second World War, naval forces can be 
expected to serve in future wars with other military forces in conducting warfare 
aimed strategically at immobilizing an enemy's economy. 
The law applicable to economic warfare has therefore developed in the 
context of the law of war, and against the expectations about future wars.16 The 
decades following the second World War have been decades of growing 
expectations that coercion will be invoked, and once commenced rising to 
coercion of the highest intensity, and therefore at highest level of tolerance. Law 
under these conditions is law that adapts to changing methods of warfare, and 
also to a growing tolerance that makes new methods of economic warfare 
tolerable and legally permissible. Moreover, because those who use force also 
rely upon judgmental standards some of which are embodied in the "Principles 
of War", these standards show a similar flexibility as states move toward new 
weapons, methods of attack and military technologies.17 The fundamental 
principle is that in which they seek an application of economies in the use of 
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force. This is in a sense forced upon them, because they are dealing here with 
scarce resources and costly destruction. 
So before commencing war, states that consider their actions with some 
deliberation also tum toward judgmental standards in which intense, and often 
costly and high risk coercive measures are not invoked unless persuasive or less 
intensive coercive actions are first considered or taken. Nevertheless, because 
warfare is a matter whose outcomes are speculative state practice, founded on 
state perceptions of the high costs and destruction involved, it is particularly 
aimed at invoking the coercive and usually forcible instruments at early stages 
to gain the strategic advantage and tactical features of surprise, shock, deception, 
and disabling initial attacks. Strategic advantage is sought as a major auxiliary 
goal because it offers an economy in the use of force, and pursuit of objectives 
through force. 
The policy and policy making of states across the spectrum of their relations 
with each other thus shift also across the coercive instruments needed exclusively 
for deterrence [relatively few if these are the major nuclear weapons] to those 
that will be needed for armed combat, particularly where that may tum out to 
be combat oflong duration, and extensive use of resources. 
The design and effective use of the military instrument and the other 
instruments of war are of great interest to policy-makers and the military 
commander. The pressure to choose against scarce resources tends in practice 
to reduce the assets available for blockades, particularly where the enemy states 
have formidable naval forces on each side to contend with. Hence a crucial test 
is that of military utility. Additionally, both commander and statesman seek to 
conform to community standards manifested in international law about the 
making of war, and about the permissibility in using the instruments of force, 
because resort to war entails the political element. A strong vision of war must 
encompass the policies and actions to be taken once the war has terminated. 
Both commander and statesman seek to have instruments that can operate 
effectively and speedily, with economy and efficiency. The fundamental objec-
tive, reciprocated with rivals and enemies and allies, is to achieve military objects, 
and ultimately political objectives, with a minimum destruction of values 
subjected to violence and destruction. 
Although the instruments of coercion may also be designed for peacetime 
use, or invoked in strategies prior to going to war, they are primarily used for 
conducting war and reaching successful conclusions to war, and also for 
strengthening law among states, and for achieving policy goals that states must 
achieve for their own well-being. The framework for inquiry into the instru-
ments of coercion is surmounted by the fundamental claim of all social orders: 
where all else fails, or where no other instruments are available or at hand, they 
are compelled to resort to self-help in the extreme cases to assure their survival. 
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The effectiveness of these instruments is measured by how closely they attain 
military and political objectives. Accordingly, they must be used within the 
standards imposed or accepted by the global community. Their effectiveness as 
instruments of war is largely determined by their efficiency and economy in use, 
but they are also determined by their operation consistent with community 
standards. Because the instruments of war are instruments intended for action, 
their effectiveness is determined by correlation in terms of action, but actions 
claimed by states are intimately tied to both policy and law. "War," according 
to Clausewitz, "is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the 
addition of other means. IS 
The assessment of economic warfare is, necessarily, an assessment that touches 
the interaction of claims to self help, and in particular self-defense, with the 
satisfaction of customary international law and United Nations Charter obliga-
tions, and the rights and responsibilities of neutrals. It inevitably leads into 
perspectives about global order. The rise of the peacekeeping and maintenance 
of order instruments under the United Nations can be attributed to new 
perceptions about the use of force, to wit, the permissible use or threat of use, 
or the use of force to counter prospective aggression, all in the context of 
achieving global order, and shifting toward collective action. But the fimdamen-
tal assessment involves the perspective regarding self-help - and thus self defense 
- and the use of force and coercion. Even in the collective forms of action for 
enforcement or maintenance of public order, states have simply turned to 
collective self-defense or concurrent or synchronous actions of self defense under 
another guise.19 . 
Economic warfare and its instruments are judged by the same standards as are 
the military instruments, and the use of economic warfare as instruments of 
coercion are judged under the standards to be found in the law of war.20 
Although economic warfare may tend toward low degrees of coercion, a 
response by way of force [assuming a response directly asserted to economic 
measures and not to forcible measures] may need to be weighed against whether 
it would be proportionate to the force used, or force needed to retaliate.21 But 
it is of critical importance that we recognize that the use of retaliatory force is 
appraised in the context of public order, self-defense, the practice and custom 
of states, and other indicia of their expectations.22 When states tum to strategic 
economic warfare, it is evident that circumstances of intensive violence are 
introduced affecting the attitudes both toward law and leading to the tolerances 
about the conduct of warfare of that nature. Apart from this, the strategies of 
economic warfare, and the separate strategies of reaching strategic goals are 
comparable in most respects to those involving the use offorce through military 
means.23 Additionally; they are strategies that include the variations employed 
by other strategies: for example, reprisals, a form of selfhelp, are applied through 
. - . 
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economic warfare, and reprisals are adopted both by the belligerents and the 
neutral states.24 
Self-Help and Self-Defense 
To assess the emerging law of economic warfare, the overall framework of 
self-help must be briefly sketched. Self-help, like the overriding conditioning 
factor of necessity, operates in the primordial relations among states. In warfare 
under the present military technologies, expectations universally anticipate 
comprehensive and high intensity violence that is not controllable under law or 
other social processes under the familiar principles and standards. Moral prin-
ciples, and the principle of war relating to humanity tend to shift toward a 
vanishing point when violence is intensified. Violence opposed by violence leads 
to the naked application of necessity. But the complementary principles that 
provide controls are intended even in wars of high intensity violence to resonate 
between the application and mutual moderation of the impact of principles of 
humanity and necessity.25 These are principles readily adopted by all states, and 
they are actively operational even in the most violent conflicts. 
But the two principles mentioned operate to control the conduct of hostilities 
themselves. Surmounting the operation of the two principles is the larger, 
constitutive goal that some states seek more fervendy than others. This goal is 
that of first achieving minimum public order, building on the existing public 
order in any event, to determine the permissibility or legitimacy of their actions. 
Some states, as with Hider's Germany and Stalin's Russia, were committed to 
public order, but it was intended to be a public order that they would control 
and dominate. Thus the belligerency may be about the constitutive elements of 
public order itself: the struggle may be for a public order configured with the 
values of one belligerent rather than another. These differing perspectives about 
global order affect the perspectives of the enemy states about the law applicable 
to their conflict. But in all conflicts, it is evident that the belligerents are involved 
in a struggle for strategic supremacy - a more limited goal, but ultimately to be 
fleshed out with a claim for public order, achieved if need be through coercion, 
or war. They may be involved in a struggle for resources. 
The notion that weapons may be distinguished and some identified as 
"offensive" and some as "defensive" is under the best of circumstances am-
biguous, and not a principle that controls the use of weapons. Military doctrine 
distinguishes offensive and defensive warfare, but the military commander, for 
reasons of exigency or choice, will use those weapons he believes will achieve 
the military object. That object involves the military attack, acquisition of enemy 
positions or territory, or destruction of enemy forces, positions, capabilities or 
logistics. 
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Self defense does not escape the element of nonnative ambiguity: the facts 
and applicable nonns are facts that may be difficult to adduce at the time of 
action, and nonns or law that is expressed in general tenns as is found in the 
United Nations Charter. There are no common law courts to work through a 
practice and tradition to make these fully manageable either as sources or the 
control of law. Accordingly, much depends uponjudgment and the reasonable 
exercise of discretion. Rules of engagement, principles relating to the introduc-
tion of force, principles concerning the just war, and principles relating to 
reprisals have in common check points for the commander or decision maker. 
They are not compulsory but are only aids to the stages employed in exercise 
of discretion or judgment.26 Acts to use force have decisional components and 
appear in analysis as a stream or flow of decision; hence going to a cou~ to have 
it rule with finality about an element in the decision has an element of unreality 
that ignores the "fog of war. ,,27 It runs counter to the development oflaw from 
dynamic situations and aimed at future dynamic situations. Law for such purposes 
)tends to develop against a larger array of facts to some extent similar to those 
that the legislator must face. 
Neutrality, The Public Order and Belligerency 
The perspectives of states in their recourse to the use of force fall within the 
framework of attitudes toward coercion.28 These perspectives have been amply 
considered by other commentators.29 The fundamental perspective is concerned 
with the protection of the existing public order, or toward the promotion of 
public order for the future that will afford greater security. This perspective is 
adopted in the claims of all participants during belligerency, including neutrals.30 
The interaction of the issues of economic warfare with these objectives raise a 
variety of problems in blockade, contraband, belligerent occupation [for 
economic purposes as well as for political purposes, or strategic purposes], and 
the expanding right of angary.31 Resort to reprisal, a separate but subordinate 
instrument of coercion, is subject to the same policy considerations. It is an 
instrument under which agents of warfare, or methods of warfare, otherwise 
impermissible, are permitted in response to the first use of such agents or methods 
by the enemy.32 
The claims relating to neutrality have a direct bearing upon economic warfare: 
belligerents that claim a right to interfere with or stop the flow of goods from 
neutrals raise issues as to the neutral behavior of states that are not participating 
in the conflict. Differences relating to the policy of neutrality have led to 
qualifications regarding the neutral's position. McDougal and Feliciano refer to a 
variety oftenns, conveying a variety of policy implications, now adopted to refer 
to neutrality. They mention "non-belligerency," "status of nonparticipation," 
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"absolute neutrality," "differential neutrality," "qualified neutrality," 
"benevolent neutrality," "pennanent neutrality" and so on.33 
States insisting that they are neutral have adopted tenns of this nature because 
they have perceived a change in the nature of belligerency in current practice: 
states that they believe to be aggressors are not entided to the full benefits of 
neutrality, so that they decide for themselves that certain freedoms will be taken 
with regard to the application of the laws otherwise restraining neutrals in their 
trade. But the larger impact of perspectives also applies: the neutral states are 
claiming the inclusive rights of states to all of the freedoms of the use of the seas 
and perhaps of air space [and in the future outer space], while the belligerents 
are claiming the exclusive rights to enclose areas of the seas and so on in which 
they will be conducting hostilities and as to which they will not be responsible 
for hann or damage caused to those that are not so engaged. 
It is evident that the changes in perspectives have an impact upon what is 
tolerated, and thus upon the emerging law relating to neutrals. So the bases of 
power of the states involved are significant factors. McDougal and Feliciano 
appropriately quote from the Norwegian historian, Orvik to this end: 
The outcome of the struggle to establish such a modus vivendi [between 
belligerents and neutrals] has at all times been entirely dependent upon the 
economic and military strength, the strategic position and the perspicacity and 
persistence of the two sides. In short, the rules of neutrality are products of two 
forces pulling in opposite directions, the final result being determined by the 
relative bargaining power of the parties.34 
In the comprehensive framework adopted by the two authors, the strategies 
for asserting and protecting the claims of the two sides, and the conditions under 
which the claims are made are adduced. Among the conditions mentioned are 
the differing demands and perspectives about global order and its future, the 
character and technology of violence, particularly with the appearance of the 
thennonuclear weapons, and the economic and social values of the various 
participants that fonn the major stakes. 
Additionally, the context of the claims process is considered. Questions raised 
include those such as the authority of a minimum order to be shared by all sides 
and from which authority relating to hostilities and regulation of those hostilities 
emanates; how minimum order is implemented to achieve international security 
in the interests of all states in the global community; and questions relating to 
the expectations of states about the effectiveness of collective security. These 
questions are important in the context of the applicable law, and in appraising 
the changes occurring in the "traditional" law. States are believed to share 
common objectives toward reaching minimum order, and toward minimizing 
the destruction of values. These perceptions appear in tum in their law, in such 
concepts as the principle of military necessity.35 
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In invoking the instruments of war, states, in general, seek to satisfy the law 
of war. Not only must the instruments satisfy the existing community standards, 
but because the policies they embody are future-oriented they are likely to 
contain expectations of an emerging law. The logic of the changing law is to be 
found in the gradual growth of global public and legal order, so that neutrality 
is subordinated to the expectations that a public order hostile to aggression will 
be served. This was the logic adopted by the Attorney-General of the United 
States in defending the neutrality position of the United States favoring the allies 
against Hider: 
It is the declared policy of the Government of the United States to extend to 
England all aid "short of war." At the same time it is the declared detenmnation 
of the government to avoid entry into the war as a belligerent .... Events since 
the World War [World War I] have rejected the fictions and assumptions upon 
which the olderruIe rested [i.e, the rules of the Hague Convention on Neutrality]. 
To appreciate the proper scope of that doctrine of impartial neutrality we must 
look to its foundations. Its cornerstone is the proposition that each sovereign state 
is quite outside of any law, subject to no control except its own will, and under 
no legal duty to any other nation.36 
The United States put forward a new category "in which certain acts of 
partiality are legal even under the law of neutrality.,,37 This introduces a new 
perspective into the law of force. An international breach of the peace under 
this view is a matter that concerns all states in large measure because they have 
adopted a global organization and a global process to achieve global order that 
reflects their community.38 ButJackson's perspective makes it a right of all states 
to act with force if they can show that they are involved in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and that global or collective efforts to do this 
were unavailing.39 It entails the element of the 'Just war" - a notion that is linked 
to the public social and legal order.4O Moreover, his is a perspective that contains 
higher expectations oflaw, and the legal and global order than we have of the 
behavior of states and their elites. In any event, his claim can fall back on 
necessity, the conditioning factor as to all international law, and upon which 
states are compelled to rely when their order breaks down. 
Jackson thus joined those who supported a higher degree of freedom for the 
policies and decisions of states that claimed they were neutrals, enabling them 
to take actions that in an early tradition would have made them belligerents.41 
Jackson found that the neutral state must meet the higher law requirements of 
the public order itself: 
A system ofinternationallaw which can impose no penalty on a law-breaker and 
also forbids other states to aid the victim would be self-defeating and would not 
help even a little to realize mankind's hope for enduring peace.42 
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Additionally, this is a concern with the permissibility or lawfulness in resorting 
to coercion, whether that coercion be exercised by military measures, or by 
economic instruments as considered here, or otherwise.43 The naval officers and 
those in their line of command as servants of their governments have similar 
concerns. The uncertainties oflaw and the appearance oflaw often in a formative 
stage make the issue of permissibility a complex one, so that all states, belligerents 
and neutrals alike, traditionally claiming a wide degree of independence, or 
absolute "sovereignty", particularly during belligerency, tend to claim that the 
law is controversial and that their actions are lawful. 44 
Secretary of State Kellogg observed in connection with neutrality and the 
I 
Kellogg-Briand Pact that we would not abandon our claims to self-defense, so 
that responses to aggression became the basis of global standards regarding the 
use of force: 
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or 
impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every 
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and 
regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and 
it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in 
self-defense. If it has a good case, the world will applaud and not condemn its 
action. . . . Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of 
self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate ajuristic 
conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold 
events to accord with an agreed definition.45 
Kellogg caught many of the main themes of community principle: self-
defense was an inherent right among states never to be suspended and preserved 
under overriding customary international law; definitions of self-defense were 
self-defeating because the subjectivities of states in their perceptions of aggression 
targeted against them tend to be overriding yet unique; wars were not eliminated 
by documents such as the Pact but only shifted to issues of aggression, and so 
46 
on. 
Section 233 of the United States Navy manual, the Law of Naval Warfare, 
declared that states may relinquish their claims to neutrality when they enter 
into security agreements: 
The right of individual and collective self-defense established by the Charter of 
the United Nations may be implemented by regional and collective self-defense 
arrangements. Under these arrangements the possibility of maintaining a status of 
neutrality and observing an attitude of impartiality depends upon the extent to 
which the Contracting Parties are obliged to give assistance to the regional action, 
or in the case of collective self-defense, to the victim of an armed attack. The 
principal effect of regional and collective self-defense arrangement is to transform 
the right of the parties to assist that State suffering from an armed attack into a duty 
to assist a State attacked.47 
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And the overriding impact of the discretionary element exercisable when 
threats intensified was noted by the American writer, Hyde: 
Realization of the fact that under certain conditions non-belligerent states may be 
disposed, for good or bad reasons, to ignore what the law of neutrality may 
normally exact is perhaps of greater importance to the members of the interna-
tional society than close appraisal of what the law of neutrality as such permits or 
forbids a neutral to do with respect to the conflict that is waged around it.48 
Economic warfare strategy partakes of general military and maritime strategy. 
Reliance on economic warfare to supplement other methods of warfare p.as been 
largely vested in the maritime states, but this is likely to change as states tum to 
strategic bombing for destroying each other's economy. But generally speaking 
there is a distinction between land and sea powers: 
... there is an enduring geopolitical difference between land and sea that affects 
importantly how man thinks about his natural habitat, the land, and an environ-
ment that is fundamentally hostile to him, the sea. The natural condition of the 
land is to be politically controlled .... The natural condition of the sea, in sharp 
contrast, is to be uncontrolled.49 
The maritime strategy of the United States has evolved over the years with 
changes in perspectives, in national interests and goals, and in the needs of the 
nation with regard to its relations with other states, especially allies. But a set of 
common themes prevail in all of the versions: the major task in command of the 
sea remains the protection of communications, a defensive task, and maintaining 
control of the sea for the protection of the nation, an offensive task. The notion, 
often advanced as propaganda and ideological strategy, that there are differences 
between weapons, some of which are identified as offensive and some defensive, 
thus becomes meaningless when states are engaged in actual combat. 50 The 
differences are those of the military commander's action and intention, and he 
may use the same weapon for either purpose: 
Elimination of offensive naval force from the National Military Establishment 
would permit us only a limited use of the seas at the cost of continued, unremitting, 
defensive efforts, and it would completely destroy the capability which we now 
possess of using the seas for offensive operations and as an area under our control 
from which to project and establish elements of the army and air force on the 
Eurasian continent. The elimination of offensive naval power throws away at one 
stroke a major component of our greatest strategic asset which is our capability of 
exploiting the elements of mobility, concentration, surprise, and economy of 
force.51 
This position was not changed by subsequent reports by authorities in charge 
of naval forces. Stress was given to new elements such as strategic deterrence, 
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but sea control and projection of sea power remained, and these are strategies 
that cross over the strategies of economic warfare. To achieve those ends, a 
maritime state needed to have superiority in naval force whether for sea control, 
power projection, strategic deterrence, or combat. It would demand flexibility 
to reach new threats to the maintenance of stability and to the containment of 
crises. The forces themselves could not rely on a substantial reserve of forces, 
hence they required a readiness in being. Admiral Watkins remarked: 
Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique escalation control charac-
teristics [a major element of deterrence and prevention] that contribute to effective 
crisis control. Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or 
non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility 
and the precision available in employing naval forces provide escalation control 
in any crisis, but have particular significance in those crises which might involve 
the Soviet Union.52 
The strategy of the Soviet Union, according to the Department of Defense, 
is said by the Soviet spokesmen to be a strategy of military sufficiency. A major 
shift in Soviet strategy is said to have occurred, because the stress is upon the 
decision and upon the political dimension and no longer a military strategy 
[whatever that means]: 
Security in the nuclear age must be evaluated differently. Assessing security is more 
and more becoming a political task. It can only be resolved by political means 
through detente, disarmament, strengthening confidence, and developing inter-
. al . 53 natIon cooperatIon. 
Maritime strategy, through rules of engagement and through doctrine, 
interacts with law and policy, each affecting the others. A nation's strategy, 
doctrine and statements about the military art might thus be combed for its 
attitude toward law, particularly because that attitude must determine what the 
perspective about the legal order itself will be. The United States maritime 
strategy in its most recent version was placed by AdmiralJames D. Watkins into 
the larger context of the national military strategy: 
Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country's political 
identity, framework, and institutions; to protect the United States, including its 
foreign assets and allies; to foster the country's economic well-being; and to bolster 
an international order supportive of the vital interests of this country and its allies. 
To achieve these ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, 
forward defense, and alliance solidarity.54 
This is a maritime strategy that is to be distinguished from our major rival, 
the Soviet Union, compelled by geography, military experience and predilection 
to adopt a land-based strategy. Watkins argues that the navy's importance tends 
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to grow during times of limited conflicts, providing, as it does, major support 
to the actions of the nation's strike forces. Hence there is a need for a versatile 
array of naval forces, and continuous adaptation to new methods of warfare and 
new targets calls for a navy commensurate with the nation's global interests. 
Admiral Watkins' reference in his statement to the preservation of the nation's 
"economic well being" indicates the expectation that economic strategies of 
warfare promoting the nation's economic strength and weakening that of the 
enemy are among those that will be adopted and given major attention. And 
like the other strategies, effective economic warfare, and the capabilities to 
exercise such warfare, are aimed at deterrence - a major element in maintaining 
the well-being of the United States and its allies, and stability with others. 
Deterrence calls for costly investment in capabilities and readiness, yet it remains 
the key to what assurance we can have to prevent aggression. We are compelled 
to conclude that our naval forces call for independent assessment as to needs, 
missions and capabilities, and unlike most other armaments fail to lend themsel-
ves to arms control equilibria or the balancing among equals simply because the 
states involved have differing interests. It is possible, but subject to speculation, 
that the rules identified with arms control and which make it effective need to 
be adjusted.55 
The law relating to economic warfare emerges from the practice and strategies 
of states with respect to the economic measures they have adopted, or the attacks 
they have mounted against the economy of the rival states.56 This law is affected 
by the changing practice and perspectives among states with regard to belligeren-
cy and neutrality.57 In both World Wars, the appearance of new methods of 
warfare had their impact upon neutrals, notably in the creation of war zones, 
the attitude and extent to which minefields were laid, and the claim of 
belligerents to sink at sight both enemy and neutral ships. With these changes 
in the law, states also tend to adopt new attitudes toward enforcing the law: 
reprisals, for example, for violations by belligerents of neutrality or reprisals by 
neutrals, are determined by the law itself, while reprisals are actions that 
affirmatively promote the law, and a changing or emerging law makes this a 
complex policy problem.58 
Such changes also had their impact upon the judgements of the prize courts, 
and therefore to the law developed through the application of principles and 
judgment. But these courts have perspectives of their own, and for a period 
during the first World War some of these courts, under the leading prize court 
judges of Britain, attempted to fit the new practices into the existing law, and 
ultimately these cases facing the realities of change were overruled. 59 The 
problem that the prize court judges faced was summed up by Commissioner 
Nielsen in the Oriental Navigation Company (1928): 
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Custom, practice and changed conditions have their effect on international law 
as well as on domestic law. However, ... a violation oflaw is not equivalent to 
a modification or abolition oflaw. The fact that new instrumentalities of warfare 
make it inconvenient for a belligerent in control of the sea in a given locality to 
act in conformity with established rules oflaw does not ipso facto result in a change 
of the law or justify disregard of the law.60 
Economic warfare may involve methods that are accompanied by the use of 
force, or by the threats to use force, or they may be used with the intention that 
they are intended to persuade the enemy to take certain actions. During warfare, 
the economic strategies are usually accompanied by the use of force, and that 
use is appraised against the standards of military necessity, the responsibility of 
states to avoid unnecessary suffering, to avoid excess in the use of force, and 
therefore meet the standards of proportionality. Accordingly, the strategy of 
economic warfare may be assessed as to the legality of the strategy that does not 
resort to force or threats of force may be treated as an unfriendly act. In those 
situations, the state resorting to such a strategy has a far greater freedom to act, 
and far more discretion than does the state that resorts to force or threats offorce. 
State practice in World War I shows the impact of belligerent practice in 
changing the written, conventional or treaty law. The United Kingdom and 
other belligerents in that war set aside the Declaration of London. And the British 
Government through a series of Orders-in-Council adopted one that was aimed 
at justifying reprisals themselves.61 The "reprisal orders" were said to be a 
response to German submarine attacks, and though not permissible under 
prevailing law were justified under special circumstances as an exercise of "an 
. bl . h f tal·· ,,62 unquesoona e ng tore laOon. 
The same period provided us with state practice concerning the changes 
occurring in the prize courts relating to contraband and other issues relating to 
the modalities or tactics of economic warfare. This practice leads us to the realities 
of state application oflaw: belligerent states tend to find the law controversial, 
and therefore they are eased into interpretations to their own liking, and states 
involved in wars of highly intensified violence tend to find much of their law 
inoperative. We might expect that this may occur with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter.63 
Traditionally, economic warfare is perceived as conduct during armed combat 
- acts that supplement the military actions, whose law evolves from belligerent 
practice and hostilities. But such acts, though not usually referred to as economic 
warfare, occur during peacetime by way of reprisals or retorsion, and though 
both persuasive and coercive, do not depend upon the use of force. Examples 
of this kind might be found in the Cuban- Missile Crisis where the quarantine 
was adopted to avoid the stigma and functional features that would have made 
up a forcible blockade - prohibited under the United Nations Charter among 
states in peaceful relations. A further example may be found in the ambiguous 
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situations currently involving the United Nations stand against Iraq, where the 
economic sanctions are purportedly those directed by the Security Council of 
the United Nations, again short of war. 
Economic strategies operable in peacetime have received less attention. 
Although such strategies may not require naval forces, the strategies themselves 
deserve brief mention. Where a nation's strategic bases ofpowerinclude its assets 
and resources, its organizational base and the morale of that base, and the values 
they prize and commitments to those values, it is evident that economic 
persuasion and coercion in peacetime may be essential to shape a rival toward 
comparable values. The strategic element arises because states seek to deter, or 
to prevent, other states from becoming a threat, and because they can readily 
see the economic base of power becoming the base for other states to become 
a rival military power.64 This perception imposed upon the current problems of 
the Soviet Union is recommended as a moderating element in the rush to assist 
that state before it shows the willingness and ability to shift toward democratic 
d · . . 65 processes an InstItutIons. 
Reprisals affecting neutrals invoked by the British during World War I, 
commencing with the Order-in-Council, March 11,1915, are illustrative of the 
actions taken to restrict German trade and commerce. 'However, as Schwarzen-
berger has pointed out, reprisals, intended to promote lawful conduct may tum 
out to be altered when the belligerents take on themselves the standards of 
application: 
In a language which applies as much to the application ofindiscriminate reprisals 
as to the pleas before the British-United States Mixed Claims Commission, 
Commissioner Pinkney pointed out: "If a belligerent is empowered by the law 
of nations to seize the property of neutrals upon its own terms whensoever that 
belligerent shall believe or affect to believe that by such means its enemy may be 
annoyed or reduced, few nations would choose to remain neuter." Once 
discretion is exercised so widely, the alleged rule "will be applied in practice upon 
false as well as mistaken grounds.,,66 
This was exactly what happened in both World Wars, and even neutral Powers 
which went to war for the revindication of the rights of neutrals, as belligerents 
swiftly changed their tune. Moreover, in both these wars, the major victorious 
Powers greatly benefitted from the law as they had shaped it and saw little reason 
why they should champion a return to the traditionallaw.67 
Thus, the strategies of states in past armed conflicts, and in "peacetime" as 
well, have included the economic instrument: i.e., states may be able to reduce 
the financial or trade flow to rivals through effective measures in such institutions 
as the GATT or IMF. The strategies may therefore be aimed at either material 
resources or at services relating to the economic process or both. They may be 
unilateral or coalition strategies. While the stress here is economic warfare at sea, 
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particularly upon blockade, the strategies in the larger sense would include a 
variety of measures intended to weaken the economy. 
According to Medlicott in the foremost study to the economic warfare carried 
on in the first World War, the "official definition" or conception of economic 
warfare adopted by the British Committee ofImperial D~fence onJuly 27, 1939, 
extends beyond activities involving the goods or services of trade and commerce 
to the strategic targets that lie in the industrial base of the enemy, i.e., industrial 
facilities and even the working population that is employed by them: 
The aid of economic warfare is so to disorganize the enemy's economy as to 
prevent him from carrying on the war. Its effectiveness in any war in which this 
country may be engaged will vary inversely with the degree of self-sufficiency 
which the enemy has attained, and/or the facilities he has, and can maintain, for 
securing supplies from neighboring countries, and directly with the extent to 
which (i) his imports must be transported across seas which can be controlled by 
His Majesty's ships, (ii) his industry and centers of storage, production, manufac-
ture and distribution are vulnerable to attack from the air, and (iii) opportunities 
arise from interfering with exports originating from his territories.68 
Medlicott noted that economic warfare is broad, expanding and flexible in 
nature, and includes "all economic activities which direcdy or indirecdy further 
the war effort of a belligerent," and that this was the usage of the United States 
after Pearl Harbor.69 He then pointed out: 
Economic warfare is a military operation, comparable to the operations of the 
three Services in that its object is the defeat of the enemy, and complementary to 
them in that its function is to deprive the enemy of the material means of resistance. 
But, unlike the operations of the Armed Forces, its results are secured not only 
by direct attack upon the enemy but also by bringing pressure to bear upon those 
neutral countries from which the enemy draws his supplies. It must be distin-
guished from coercive measures appropriate for adoption in peace to settle 
international differences without recourse to war, e.g., sanctions, pacific blockade, 
economic reprisals, etc., since, unlike such measures, it has as its ultimate sanction 
the use of belligerent rights.70 
In assessing the effects of the economic warfare, Medlicott noted the staying 
power of Germany in World War II, its use of resources from captive nations, 
its ingenuity in finding substitutes, but also the growing gap in production by 
the allies when production was compared with Gennany. Nevertheless, 
The picture was of an economy achieving with difficulty the demands of a 
supreme war effort, with too slight a reserve of human or industrial resources to 
achieve much more. Raw material shortage seemed to be the main handicap to 
economic expansion, and certainly the one most vulnerable to economic warfare 
attack; it was necessary, therefore, to relax none of the existing forms of pressure 
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on the neutrals, and also to ensure that Gennany found no escape from her 
difficulties by other means .... 71 
The strategies employed in war are affected by changes in the methods of 
warfare, the introduction of new military technologies, and by the appearance 
of new weapons.72 These changes all have their effect on the law, because each 
of these must be assimilated under that law, or the law must render them 
impermissible. Moveover, neutrality itself has been affected, as is clear from the 
introduction to this paper, and that has in part been the result of the independent 
authority among states to determine when war has broken out [hence to 
determine its neutrality or other relations it might have with the hostile states], 
and which side might have been acting unlawfully [hence the determination of 
whether the "neutral" state can refrain from aiding the aggressor, or afford 
discriminatory and privileged support to its victim]. 
The strategy of economic warfare as set down by the British government 
suggests the growing magnitude of the strategy in a major war: 
1. To prevent the two enemy dominions Oapan and Gennan] from establishing 
economic exchange by blockade running; still more, of course, to prevent their 
opening regular communications by land or sea. 
2. To develop the increased possibilities of economic pressure on the neutral 
border States adjacent to Gennan Europe and on Vichy French colonies to the 
fullest extent which the military situation permits, with a view both to obtaining 
supplies and to denying to the enemy resources which are becoming more than 
ever essential to him. 
3. To develop within occupied countries both in Gennan Europe and in the Far 
East all forms of passive and active resistance to economic exploitation. 
4. To develop methods for directing against the increasing weakness of 
Gennany's war potential attack from the air which shall really be effective. 
5. To devise combined operations against the most important accessible 
economic targets in enemy-occupied territory and against his lines of communica-
tion. 
6. To defend important sources of supply and access to them, including the 
supplies of South America.73 
Further complications arose after the major wars with the United Nations 
Charter, because the Charter provides for the Security Council to have primary 
- actually exclusive - authority with regard to matters relating to the maintenance 
of the peace, or with regard to aggression. Once seized of the matter and once 
it proclaims the enforcement decisions and actions to be taken, all members of 
281 Almond 
the United Nations will, unless excepted [which is unlikely], be included in 
support of the United Nations action.14 
And other complications arise with the advent of the United Nations with 
regard to interpretation of critical language, such as that concerning "anned 
attack" as used in Article 51. Because war is outlawed, but aggression remains a 
reality, the states have been compelled to shift their vocabulary to fit aggression 
and self-defense into concepts for a regulatory process, and they have built upon 
their experience in fonnulating the laws of war. Here again the determination 
or appraisal offacts indicating an "anned attack" must be that of the victim state 
or the state that might be involved in what it claims to be a response by way of 
self-defense to an anned attack, subject to broad standards as to making that 
response, and the force that it is using. 
Accordingly, we have seen the rise of new claims as to the policy or content 
of neutrality: non-belligerency, non-participation, and non-alignment, adding 
further ambiguity, functional in nature and in their differences, and indicating 
relationships with all or some of the belligerents not to be governed by the 
traditional rules of neutrality. The impact upon the tactics, or modalities, of 
economic warfare at sea has been felt, commencing with the renunciation during 
World War I of the application of the Declaration of London, 1909. Events had 
by then already indicated that new methods of warfare and new claims of the 
belligerents overrode the rules laid down in that Declaration. Had it remained 
in force, it would have led only to confusion about the standards that govern 
legitimate reprisals, and the tendencies clearly shown in the second World War 
for states to talk past each other, claiming reprisals and counter-reprisals to cover 
all of their attacks regardless of target and the force applied. 
Changes occurred also in the geographical features that affected neutral states. 
The global reach of major wars led to the claims of states, separately and as part 
of the regional groupings, to freeing adjacent seas, extending far into the high 
seas, from the presence of belligerent naval vessels. This was illustrated in the 
Declaration of Panama in 1939.15 
In addition to these political and legal implications, the strategies of economic 
warfare are determined by whether they rest upon coercive techniques or 
persuasive techniques, or mixtures of these, and they may be used concurrently 
or separately. But during wartime, the strategies are imposed primarily through 
coercive measures that include the concurrent resort to force or threat to use 
force. The law relating to coercive strategies or strategies that depend ultimately 
upon the use offorce operates through the standards of reasonableness: necessity, 
proportionality in the use of force, attack on legitimate military objects. 
Economic deprivation strategies such as those mentioned here may be refined 
substantially in the future so that they, operating under the familiar principle of 
economy of force [or of resources committed to actions against a rival], will 
become more effective. Further refinements may be expected to arise from 
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reaching deep into a rival's economy, attacking the industrial base, the logistics 
and transportation facilities, and even the civilian population engaged in military 
production. This was the expectation associated with city strikes during the 
second World War. Hence it is stressed here that these strategies affect the 
emerging law, giving it content, and they are assessed under the law relating 
generally to the exercise of coercion. 
The "sources" of the law applicable to economic warfare include the 
customary international law , a law that is dynamic and is responsive to continuing 
change in state practice; treaties such as the Declaration of London, 1909,76 that 
apply now only to the customary international law they embody; the various 
instructions and navy regulations;77 law of war manuals and rules of engagement 
which, though not among the formal sources, are the evidence of the law, and 
reflect the practice of states. 78 General principles assimilated by the Prize Courts, 
to wit, the municipal courts designed to resolve issues relating to contraband or 
other non-neutral conduct of neutral states, may also be included. Documents 
and a careful inquiry into this subject is provided by such writers as Carlton 
Savage, with his two volume work for the Department of State extending into 
World War I. 
While definitions of economic warfare have already been given, and none 
are universally accepted, it is evident that the conception to be usable must be 
functional. A general conception of economic warfare embodies measures taken 
to reach the economies of other states, is the outcome of strategies used by states 
to influence, alter or control the decisions or policies of an adversary or aimed 
at neutral states that might be providing economic assistance to an adversary. 
Such warfare, during armed combat, is supported or promoted by military 
measures, especially by the naval forces. The methods and strategies used are 
controlled under law, but they also promote or give policy content to the law, 
operating to make it effective. Whether perceived as a strategy by policy or 
decision makers in general in pursuing their goals, or as a strategy by the military 
force and especially the naval forces acting in the operational dimension of 
hostilities, economic warfare is judged under legal standards of reasonableness 
and effectiveness. 
The law of economic warfare is a continuously emerging law, drawing upon 
the changes in the relations of states, upon the technologies that affect their 
war-fighting capabilities, upon the national power that underpins their strength, 
and upon the changes that are occurring in the conduct of hostilities. The strong 
trends in this law include the trends reflecting a changing law, changing with 
the belligerent practice among states, and the changes imposed through tech-
nology, and its impact upon the conduct of hostilities. These changing trends 
have shown their impact upon the law relating to contraband, the doctrines of 
ultimate voyage and continuous voyage, practice relating to navicerts and other 
administrative measures, and blockade. 
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Major studies have been concerned with domestic legislation alone: the 
history and emergence of neutrality in the United States, the legislation adopted, 
and the changes to that legislation trace political perspectives that replaced the 
notions of "neutrality" with "non-belligerence," "non-alignment," and so on. 
Such features as state-trading and the peculiar claim of exemption of such trading 
from the usual practice and law with regards to neutrals have gradually vanished 
as naval warfare became a global activity?9 Where however the tendency might 
be to maintain the traditional law on the books, it is likely that the changes will 
be made either through resort to the claim of reprisals, or through outright 
violation of the law. 80 
According to Alford, economic warfare is "material resource" warfare.81 He 
refers to such warfare as 
... intentional disturbances of the flow of material resources among people and 
of the processes by which these resources are used to produce values. Under the 
rubic "modern economic warfare" are embraced such apparently disparate prac-
tices as the preemption of scientific knowledge and skill to deny them to an 
adversary and interferences with the transport of materials such as nuclear and 
biological weapons, not regarded as wealth in a conventional sense.82 
Julius Stone has pointed out that the economic warfare and the expectations 
of states that engage in it have changed with the experience during conflict. 
Napoleon attempted to ruin Britain commercially by attacks on British maritime 
commerce, and did not succeed. He was faced with British naval power that 
made his efforts fruidess. The link was made by early commentators between 
maritime commerce and the need for a navy: Mahan is cited as an authority for 
the claim that without maritime commerce, there was no further interest for a 
nation to protect, hence no need for its navy. But Mahan was inconsistent in 
these views, because he subsequendy discovered the need for naval power to 
reduce a rival's war fighting capabilities both at sea and in general. Shifts in 
perspectives ranged from those who claimed that economic warfare was to claim 
the wealth of a rival, and those who viewed such warfare as a strategic enterprise, 
affecting its war capabilities. 
Some of the military changes appeared with the emergence of submarine and 
air warfare applied to maritime commerce as well as to its protection. Attempts 
here, under law to regulate such military actions, led to a general breakdown in 
the agreements relating to both, and states, though they tried in 1923 to reach 
a convention for air warfare, were unsuccessful, and none has yet been achieved. 
The demands of humanity were in large measure overriden by the demands of 
military necessity, as the attacks on the Lusitania and the Sussex were to show 
during the first World War. The Nuremberg Trial of Admiral Doenitz finding 
violations oflaw but refusing punishment was unable to clarify the matter. The 
Court said: 
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In view of all the facts proved and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty 
announced on May 8, 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk at sight 
in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating 
that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the 
United States from the first day that nation entered the war, the sentence on 
Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of 
submarine warfare.a. 
Alford believes that economic warfare is waged during periods of "general 
military stalemate." The emerging perception however is that economic warfare 
may be characterized as a form of economic coercion, and the effectiveness of 
coercion may arise from the economic "disturbances" alone, or through the 
parallel or simultaneous exercise of military coercion. But Alford correctly 
perceives that coercive economic practices may be invoked during the lesser 
wars or hostilities of violence that has not reached the high intensity of a major 
war. Moreover, it may be an instrument that can be designed to vary the coercive 
element. The state invoking economic warfare may be able to avoid escalation 
in the intensity of coercion, perhaps simply threatening its adversary with military 
force not invoked. In doing this it has an instrument that may be less costly, 
more efficient, and more effective especially in terms of political goals that follow 
the confrontation, and more flexible in terms of the diplomatic or ideological 
[including propaganda] options available to it. At the time this paper is being 
written, this is one of the elements still available for the United States and others, 
acting pursuant to a coalition formed under the auspices and mandate of the 
U.N. Security Council. 
Alford also suggests that if states, like the United States and the Western 
democratic states, are to have the advantage of the economic instrument of 
coercion, they must have the appropriate power base within the government to 
provide for a professional and continuing inquiry into invoking it. This at present 
is lacking. Like other policy instruments at our disposal, the instrument gains 
effectiveness through close inquiry and attention to its use, and to inquiry into 
the use of such techniques by others against us. Alford's text is then an attempt 
to strengthen the coercive economic instrument through a framework of inquiry 
addressing a process of claims and counterclaims among states including the 
working of that process within the government and its own cadres. 
The larger context in which the instrument is involved extends to the 
persuasive economic instrument, so that the nation would seek to persuade allies 
or friendly states, and even, when the occasion demands, use persuasion with or 
in place of coercion with regard to rivals. But the usual context for economic 
warfare is that of the use of a coercive instrument, and its effectiveness is 
determined by the extent to which the flow of material resources of an adversary 
have been impaired, the duration of that impairment, and the elements in the 
economic process that are affected. 
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The economic sanctions of the Security Council against Iraq [commencing 
in 1990] were all-inclusive. It was expected that through such sanctions, 
sufficiendy and intensively imposed, Iraq would meet the terms imposed by its 
adversaries without an outbreak in war. Hence, while the tendency has been to 
step aside from describing the situation as one of anned combat or war, the use 
of sanctions are used as if a war had been declared between the parties. It is 
evident that the use of such measures are permitted through the United Nations 
Charter without regard to ascribing the element of war, but it is also clear that 
Iraq has seized the territory of Kuwait through aggression, and that continued 
possession of that territory adverse to the legitimate government and to the global 
community at large constitutes a continued aggression. Accordingly, the states 
involved can invoke collective self defense where Kuwait has called for assis-
tance, and, according to some views, they might claim self defense itsel£ The 
claim of self-defense however would require a clear showing that Iraq's action 
was aggression against their "political independence", "territorial integrity", or 
against the objects and purposes of the Charter. 
The coercive element in economic warfare directs us to the action element, 
but the design and use of economic warfare techniques lead to modifications in 
the law. It is evident that with changing methods of warfare and therefore 
changing tolerances about the attacks that are made and the weapons used, the 
law will be affected. The law is largely shaped by how states behave in their 
recourse to coercion. Coercively oriented, the economic warfare is aimed at 
resources, but more direcdy according to Alford at creating "psychical disequi-
librium in the power elite of the adversary." He cites Liddell Hart as describing 
this "as the sense of being trapped.85 Effective use of economic warfare is 
characterized by a reaction in the target elite or adversary in which it accepts 
demands before the situation deteriorates. This of course is the expectation in 
imposing such sanctions on Iraq in the current crisis. Nonetheless, economic 
warfare alone is insufficient to force major policy changes: military power is 
almost always required. 
Numerous other correlations of economic warfare tactics and the traditional 
tactics in the use of military force could be mentioned. These serve us here to 
freshen our perceptions about the application of the principle of economy of 
force, of, perhaps, the various law of war principles, applied however to the 
economic warfare techniques, the need to select target elites with care, and to 
determine as far as possible the effectiveness of the technique in achieving results. 
Economic warfare when coupled with the activities of irregular or guerrilla 
forces, or in the context of limited or regional wars, raises problems that are not 
addressed in this paper. 
The attempts described in this paper to balance out opposing principles, one 
favoring the command and freedom of the seas, and the other favoring the claims 
of belligerents to deny commerce with their rivals creates the primary difficulties 
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for laying down the principles of economic warfare at sea. This balancing of 
principles is given added complexity under the strategies of states, because 
economic warfare may only be a strategy to deny a rival belligerent essential 
goods, or it may be a larger strategy, such as that aimed at opposing its 
war-making powers or capabilities. In the second perspective, which as shown 
earlier was adopted in World War II, the larger economic strategy combining 
military action and the goals of destroying the economy led to strikes at the cities 
and urbanized areas, at industrial and economic targets, and even the populations 
that service these targets, as well as the traditional strategies of reaching com-
merce on the seas.86 The economic strategy was thus the underpinning for the 
methods of economic warfare, one being used to justify the other. 
Much of this is put by the commentators at the tum of the 20th Century. 
Captain Mahan in a familiar passage puts the argument for a strategy of economic 
warfare that is aimed primarily at reaching commerce and trade: 
The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of 
contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence, frequently culminating 
in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength 
of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its 
growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a dispropor-
tionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by 
the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when 
these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused 
by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of 
the advantages of commerce and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to 
wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly 
modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea.87 
Thus belligerents, under current conditions seek through superior seapower 
to stop entirely the trade of their rivals with others, ensuring, they believe, that 
these goods that would serve the war effort once denied will have an important 
impact upon weakening the capabilities of the rival. But in shifting to the war 
fighting capabilities, they have also shifted their perspectives toward a strategy 
that acquiesces in targeting economic and industrial targets through air strikes. 
In the past, their objectives were more materialistic and less strategic, because 
they then sought to acquire the fruits of that commerce in order to benefit from 
the goods acquired and not made available to their rivals.88 Mahan supports 
resort to "history" and the past practice of states in naval warfare, but argues that 
changes in naval warfare are such that "theories about the naval warfare of the 
future are almost wholly presumptive.,,89 He refers to the shift for example in 
naval armaments: the "powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to 
maneuver for an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men, to 
devote the greater part of the crew to the offensive weapons .... ,,90 
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Sergei Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union writing in the 
middle of the 20th Century, uncovered interests ofhis country in a naval force. 
Foremost in these interests he included the resources of the seas, and the 
traditional uses. But "the main goal" for building the Soviet or communist naval 
forces lies in building up communism: 
For the Soviet Union, the main goal of whose policy is the building of communism 
and a steady rise in the welfare of its builders, sea power emerges as one of the 
important factors for strengthening its economy, accelerating scientific and tech-
nical development and consolidating the economic, political, cultural and scien-
tific links of the Soviet people with the peoples and countries friendly to it.91 
Building on this theme throughout the book, Gorshkov in the conclusion 
turns the Western theme back upon the Western states by insisting that it is not 
they who are expansionist. The imperialists are pressing expansion. The com-
petitive arena into which naval forces must be introduced lead to: 
A new stage in the struggle to divide up and take over the oceans for economic 
and military purposes may now be observed. The World Ocean is becoming the 
object of a kind of expansion by the imperialist states. It is obvious that in this 
struggle navies, as an instrument of policy, will occupy an important place92 
Admiral Gorshkov has thus proved to be fully capable of handling the political, 
polemics and dialectics of his civilian counterparts, and thus, presumably, able 
to woo away sizable funds for the building of the Soviet navy. In two passages 
of related argument, he noted: 
It is reasonable to consider that the totality of the means of harnessing the World 
Ocean and the means of defending the interests of the state when rationally 
combined constitute the sea power of the state, which determines the capacity of 
a particular country to use the military-economic possibilities of the ocean for its 
93 
own purpose 
McDougal and Feliciano and numerous other commentators have reviewed 
the tactics and program of economic warfare in detail.94 They point out that 
three tasks are involved. First, the characterizing of the goods and perhaps 
services to be prohibited or controlled. This activity identifies contraband, 
involving an appraisal as to the relation of the goods to the military capabilities 
of the enemy belligerent, and the application of doctrines relating to contraband. 
[Services might include the commercial provision ofinformation from satellites. 
Reaching the satellites would require either ground, air or space-based inter-
ference, including the use of naval platforms for this purpose]. Second, stopping 
the flow of commerce that might increase the war potential or fighting 
capabilities of the rival, as well as the flow of neu~ commerce in general. Third, 
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determining the disposition of the goods and the carrying craft, i.e., through 
destruction, condemnation, requisition or release [usually through the deter-
mination of the prize courts]. The modalities for conducting controls at sea 
extend from visit and search to certification of cargoes at their point of delivery 
or source or shipment. The modalities mentioned here tend to change, and 
significant change has an impact upon the law itself causing the parties to change 
or adopt differing perspectives about the applicable law. The modalities for 
imposing economic warfare through coercion at sea are supplemented by the 
use of aircraft and submarines and these have had a major impact upon the law 
and leading to frequent change in the applicable rules.95 
Appraising the impact of these activities, McDougal and Feliciano conclude 
that both belligerent and neutral states are in a process of claim that is advancing 
community standards. The primary objective for each is to minimize the 
destruction of values prized by the neutral and belligerents, and encompassed in 
the law of war under the principle of economy of force.96 
Detailed consideration here of the various activities and modalities must be 
followed in the writing of the commentators. But it is essential to bear in view 
the changing, dynamic nature of this form of warfare because of the new 
techniques of warfare, both in application and in weaponry, and the delivery of 
weapons, and because of the relations of the parties where they may maintain 
in parallel a considerable array of relations while confronting each other with 
imminent hostilities [as currently in the Middle East, the Iraqi crisis]. 
The rapid drawing down on reserves of resources or materials is another 
dynamic feature: many materials are in scarce supply, but are essential to effective 
war fighting with advanced technologies; some, like petroleum products, are 
vulnerable to attack and to denial through blockade, and are rapidly depleted by 
modem vehicles, aircraft and ships during the conduct of hostilities. Difficulties, 
and change in perception have arisen with regard to the goods that fall within 
contraband: early prize cases indicate that even foodstuffi contribute to the 
rfi h . bili" 97 wa g tmg capa tIes. 
The overall framework of economic warfare is also affected by a change in 
the violence and extent of the violence: a shift from the major global wars of 
the first half of the century to wars more limited in every respect may lead to a 
differing balancing out of the principles, so that the neutral states are favored, 
and peaceful activities within the public order protected. Blockade is then 
metamorphosed into other configurations: the term "quarantine" was used for a 
specific activity of denying Soviet missiles to Cuba,98 and the term "interdiction" 
by the United States and others, including the Security Council of the United 
Nations, to refer to the interceptions made with ships passing to and from Iraq. 
Forcible blockades provide an additional problem: if the view is taken that 
the blockade may not lead to the destruction of ships, particularly those that are 
caught within the war zone where the blockade is enforced, then the use of 
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aircraft and submarines would be shackled.99 Here we have a collision in the 
new methods of warfare with traditional attitudes about the character of the 
blockade and its effectiveness. Past practice suggests that in warfare the changes 
in the use of force are the dominant elements affecting the perspectives of 
belligerents and non-belligerents alike, in some measure because they reflect the 
changing and intrusion of the new military technologies and new organization 
of combat units to impose force, including the blockades.1OO Admiral Miller, 
quoting Lauterpacht, catches this factor: 
Measures regularly and unifonnly repeated in successive wars in the fonn of 
reprisals and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing belligerent, must 
be regarded as a development of the latent principle of blockade, namely that the 
belligerent who possesses effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his 
opponent thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own vessels or of 
convening on neutral vessels such goods as are destined to or originate from him.101 
Of particular interest in the emerging law of economic warfare is the ease 
with which the belligerents have imposed their perceptions that the law must 
change with changing modalities or techniques of warfare, so that we find the 
use of force dominating such perspectives, and leading to change in such 
instruments as the Declarations of Paris and London. Similarly, national policy 
regarding the prosecution of the war dictated the attitudes, and affected the law 
concerning controls. Such law was most often the domestic statutory law, but 
the impact may be to remove goods from exemptions, or as public enemy 
property no longer protected by the Declaration of Paris. 102 
The Declaration of London perhaps was weakest in denying Britain its most 
effective naval tactic in economic warfare. Captain Maurice P.A. Hankey, naval 
assistant secretary for the Committee of Imperial Defence, observed that this 
would require repudiation of the instrument, and that otherwise Britain would 
be unable to refine the notion ofblockade toward true effectiveness: 
[In the absence of the Declaration] In that case our obvious course, to be adopted 
as soon as the naval situation permitted, would be to declare a blockade of the 
North Sea ports, and simultaneously to make a sweeping declaration of what was 
contraband, including all the principal raw materials on which Gennan manufac-
turers depend as well as her main articles of export. Neutral vessels would be 
rigorously held up and examined outside the Cattegat; the doctrine of continuous 
voyage would be rigorously applied; a system of agents in Swedish, Danish, and 
Russian ports would apprise us as to how trans-shipment was taking place and 
measures would be taken to deal with offenders.103 
Economic warfare is thus conceived as a part of a national strategy, and as 
aimed at strategic goals. Nations engage upon a strategy, or at times referred to 
as a "grand strategy" that provides them a framework for national purpose and 
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the exercise of national power, aimed at the optimization of values that they 
prize. A crucial element of each nation's strategy is aimed at protecting the nation 
and its values, and "interests" from the threats or attacks of others. 
The United States and its allies cannot forego doctrine and a strategy aimed 
at countering as well as deterring aggression or threats of aggression regardless 
of source. For this reason, as well for the others stated earlier, the decline of the 
Soviet Union is not a sufficient reason for turning attention from the possible 
threats that might arise, particularly if that state under new elites in the future, 
or through chaos and breakdown, creates such a threat. I04 Soviet doctrine and 
concepts of the military art should be appraised to determine Soviet perspectives; 
rules of engagement, regulations, instructions for the men of the fleet, and so 
on, are not available, but would prove valuable if they are published. Neverthe-
less even without a comprehensive inquiry into all of the Soviet directives, it is 
unlikely that the Marxist-Leninist framework of reference will vanish, or that 
the United States would find it sufficient to relinquish caution in the future 
dealings. lOS 
Perhaps the major reason for avoiding the equalities and "stabilization" 
anticipated under arms control agreements when controls are to be imposed 
upon naval forces is that the interests of states that are land-based and those that 
are the maritime states, or "thalassocracies", differ in substance and need. I06 The 
United States has interests to protect in peacetime relating to its trade, allies, and 
interests not matched by the Soviet Union; its interests in the event of armed 
combat even with states other than the Soviet Union might include a refined 
development of economic warfare, its modalities, techniques and tactics. 
These differences in the larger terms of reference found in the maritime 
strategy as a whole were raised and considered at the Adderbury Conversations 
on Naval Strategy and Arms Control July 30-31, 1988, and the United States 
position summarized in the first statements: 
The Americans explained their maritime strategy in terms of the nature ofW estern 
forces, the nature of adversary forces and national strategic culture. United States 
maritime strategy (a) was a defensive deterrent against a threatening land power 
and (b) emphasizes coalition warfare. Forward positioning offorces was required 
by both of these factors .. It reduced misperception and contributed to stability as 
well as economizing on forces. Alternative strategies like direct defence of shipping 
were more force intensive. Once war begins, the American participants argued, 
maritime forces must be used offensively to be effective: the offensive was the 
stronger form of war at sea.107 
Perceived in this sense, a strategy includes the programs, plans and policy 
framework that provide guidance to the means that are to be adopted or refined 
to achieve the strategic goals. Tactics are therefore distinguished from strategy 
and strategies, because they are the instrumental, or operational, means by which 
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the strategic goals are to be attained. Economic warfare at sea comprises the 
national tactics, and the methods used are either for enforcement or as policy 
instruments or policy oriented strategies, subject to refinement and change, to 
achieve goals. 
But why is the law of economic warfare subject to continuing change? Our 
analysis indicates that this is the result of the interaction oflaw and the policy 
instrument. Because the instruments of economic warfare are controlled under 
law, but they also are the means to strengthen or promote the law. It can be said 
that the tactics identified with economic warfare both promote the existing law 
and lend themselves toward shaping the content of the law of the future; the 
continuing change in the methods and tolerances regarding economic warfare 
thus leads to a continuing change ana refinement in the law that is applicable. 
Other factors in the application of the law relating to economic warfare should 
be mentioned. Recourse to precedents is a traditional factor oflega! inquiry, but 
according to Mahan, ofless importance to strategy: 
It is not . . . a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the 
history of sailing ships as well as that of galleys. Both have their points of 
resemblance to the modem ship; both have their points of essential difference, 
which makes it impossible to cite their experience or modes of action as tactical 
precedents to be followed. But a precedent is different from and less valuable than 
a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through 
change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, 
and, however various its applications as conditions change, remains a standard to 
which action must conform to attain success. War has such principles; their 
existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and 
in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons change; but to cope 
with one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to those constant 
teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations 
of war which are comprised under the name of strategy. lOS 
Precedent in the law, especially when associated with war, has a differing 
operational position. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in In re Yamashita, pointed 
out that a war crimes trial, and its appeal in the United States Supreme court, 
was without precedent, and that the precedent not to proceed was of great 
importance. Seemingly alluding to the difficulty in the prosecution's getting a 
grasp on the operational, juridical facts, he noted: 
Precedent is not all-controlling in law. There must be room for growth, since 
every precedent has an origin. But it is the essence of our tradition for judges, 
when they stand at the end of the marked way, to go forward with caution, 
keeping sight, so far as they are able, upon the great landmarks left behind and the 
direction they point ahead. If, as may be hoped, we are now to enter upon a new 
era oflaw in the world, it becomes more important than ever before for the nations 
creating that system to observe their greatest traditions of administering justice, 
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including this one, both in their own judging and in their new creation. The 
proceedings in this case veer so far from some of our time-tested road signs that 
I cannot take the large strides validating them would demand. 109 
Hence the intermingling of precedent, strategy, tactics and an emerging law 
occurs in a dynamic framework of situations, affected by rapid change in events 
associated with warfare and its technologies. This perspective has been caught 
with regard to submarine warfare in general, and is applicable to the development 
of such warfare for economic warfare: 
There is no guarantee that the kntisubmarine measures successful in the past will 
continue to be adequate in the future. A clear understanding of the events of 
World War II, their reasons and consequences, is necessary, however, as back-
ground for any decisions which are to be made in the postwar period .... One 
overall conclusion is clearly evident ... the introduction of new weapons, gear, 
and tactics has led to a continual interplay of measures and countermeasures in 
which no other conclusion retains its validity for very long.110 
The changes in strategy affected by changes in methods of warfare are so great 
that they are likely to have an impact upon the humanitarian element in the law 
of war, as is evident in the following: 
According to an early distinction between strategy and tactics, strategy comprised 
the set of decisions made and acted on out of sight of the enemy; tactics comprised 
the rest. The advent of modern weapons, such as carrier-based aviation, has 
permitted outright battles to occur at greater than visual ranges, and the modern 
version of the distinction holds that a strategic actor is one who does not have 
"contact" with the enemy. "Strategic warfare" has come to refer to war made 
against population [which had been under the care of the Geneva Conventions] 
or industry, and latterly, to such war waged with nuclear weapons. The term 
"operational art" introduced by Soviet thinkers but well on its way to adoption 
by the West identifies a more highlighted layer, between strategy and tactics. A 
further useful distinction divides strategy and "grand strategy," the latter being the 
total scheme of national military endeavor, including economic elements. 111 
The "grand themes" of sea powers over the period from the ancient Greeks 
to the present are described by one commentator in terms of the rise of the 
thalassocracies, i.e., the states that have either substantially augmented their sea 
power relative to other states, or have established sea forces as part of the 
comprehensive maritime state. Great land-powers like the Soviet Union thus 
would innately move toward sea forces that would provide it with defense, and 
a reasonable, and sufficient defense would be its goal. The great sea powers seek 
command of the sea, in part because of their dependance upon that command, 
calling for the following elements: a superior fighting fleet to maintain exclusive 
control of the seas; a naval capability to defend against invasion; to protect 
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mantlme commerce; to blockade the enemy coast; to engage in combined 
activities with other military services; and, to provide under current conditions 
. h . b b d 112 WIt strategic om ar ment. 
One commentator recommends that the United States recognize its role as 
the enforcer of peace upon the seas: 
If international agreements on laws to govern the sea finally emerge, or if new 
defensive treaties are enacted, it will still be American sea power which will 
enforce them. Even should new agreements not occur, or should they fail, the 
United States will unilaterally continue to use its sea power to enforce free 
exchange upon the sea. This is the legal right of any maritime nation - in our case 
the most powerful nation in history at that - much of whose livelihood is derived 
from the sea. Happily, most of the civilized world - which profits thereby - is 
grateful for it. 113 
How does this practice bear upon the law of economic warfare? It appears 
that states involved in coercive actions are not concerned with the "progressive 
development" of law, or with identifying that law with a larger, constitutive 
global order as such. Their primary concern is with the freedom to act when 
they resort to the use of force, but they want for symbolic, prestigious, or even 
power-oriented reasons, to have the permission to act under law or to be 
supported by law in their actions. 
When states tum to the use of force they are turning to an instrument to 
promote or strengthen their law, but the law that they are concerned with is at 
best the law that gives them the support of their actions, and enables them 
through the collective element that makes up law to draw upon community 
support. From law they attain a certain degree of economy in their actions, 
because the costs or burdens in turning to force are either reduced, or some of 
them are eliminated. And acting "within the law" they have a calculus of 
permissive actions rather than one of actions that others may condemn as 
"aggression," or "tortious," or wrongful, and therefore that they may refrain 
from assisting or supporting. 
Strategic Economic Warfare 
Economic warfare at sea considered in terms of the objectives or purposes is 
part of economic warfare in general. Strategies to strangle an enemy's economy 
are invoked by resort to all of the military capabilities, as well as the non-military 
strategies. They may be applied during "peacetime" or during "wartime," 
drawing upon Security Council directives, and so on. Strategic economic 
warfare thus refers to warfare aimed at the enemy's economy. The modal:ties of 
strategic economic warfare have been affected by the advances in military 
technology, so that submarines are now armed with weapons that can operate 
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against economic targets, while submarines themselves may engage through their 
traditional role of destroying sea commerce to achieve supporting objectives. 
The operational element in warfare thus has a major impact upon the 
perspectives of states and their elites. States during wartime claim a freedom to 
act, or determine the decisions to be taken, because of the necessities involved, 
and the overriding need of self preservation. Moreover, the necessities in war 
are affected by new weapons, new technologies, and new means for conducting 
warfare. All such determinations tend to couple perspectives about force 
planning, deterrence, strategy, both military strategy and the "grand" or overall 
li . al d· al li 114 po tic strategy, an nation po cy. 
Once the legal or policy hurdles that strategic warfare is an attack on the 
civilian population have passed, states insist that they are acting permissibly under 
the legal principle of military necessity. They can then claim that as long as they 
pursue the objectives of reaching the military economy or the economy that 
supports the military effort they can mount their attacks on cities, the urban 
population, the entire structure that supports the war effort. They can also justifY 
the use of weapons that are less discriminate, and the line between discriminate 
and indiscriminate attacks begins to blur, and with this development, the line 
between protecting the noncombatant under the law of war becomes cloudy as 
well.11 5 
The economic warfare that is invoked during hostilities has its counterpart in 
the economic sanctions invoked during peacetime, in particular, the sanctions 
adopted pursuant to directives of the Security Council of the United Nations. 
Here there is opportunity to pursue the imposition of coercion in stages, but 
there is also the probable drawback that attaining the support of states in the 
Security Council will have retarding impacts upon a war or combat strategy, 
affecting surprise, deception, and so on, or enabling the targeted state to gain 
the advantlge of breakdown in the coalition it faces, or to secure a more 
substantial grip on its military forces and capabilities. 
The current application of sanctions under Security Council directives and 
community participation [but with the United States taking the lead] is aimed 
at the head of the Iraqi government, and, presumably, will be aimed at those 
who might assume the lead in the event he is incapacitated or removed. But it 
is also a sanctioning strategy that necessarily must be aimed at the populace, their 
representatives, other states in the region, and supported by a military, economic, 
ideological and diplomatic array of threats. 
Economic warfare - when we assess it in terms of the targets - draws upon 
the use of military forces, and may be enhanced by diplomatic and ideological 
strategies as well. With changes in the military capabilities and weaponry of states, 
belligerent states adopt new modalities of economic warfare, primarily shaped 
by the targets of the new weapons. Thus, during the second World War, the 
belligerent states turned to strategic economic warfare with new weaponry, 
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particularly through the intensified use of strikes by aircraft. The important 
feature in economic sanctions, or economic warfare, is that they involve actions 
usually supported by coercion to achieve their goals and that these actions gain 
their legality or permissibility through the reaction of other states, and ultimately 
through cemmunity standards. The claim element is of major importance in the 
process of claim that leads to law when the actions involving coercion are in 
view. Control, under law, or under social or other processes, upon the resort to 
economic warfare is thus guided by the general principles in the law of war, or 
the law relating to coercion, but additional, more detailed controls call for a 
continuing clarification of state perspectives about such actions, and thus the 
emergence of what they will tolerate ultimately to be found in the governing 
law with regard to their behavior.116 
State practice in the use of strategic aircraft strikes prepared the way for the 
doctrinal acceptance, at least, for targeting strategic nuclear weapons on the 
urban communities, the so-called "counter-value strategy" and the adoption of 
the newly appearing nuclear weaponry both for offensive and defensive military 
objectives. Inherent in the "humane" version of this strategy was that it was 
applicable to threats, but not applicable to the actual use of weapons, but this 
distinction would be difficult to maintain in belligerent practice. However, with 
the rise of nuclear weaponry, states adopted military strategies and political 
strategies, with each drawing upon the other for support, wherever possible. : 
During combat, the military strategy, whose emphasis on the use offorce and 
on using it to strengthen other strategies prevails. During peacetime, the political 
strategy is adopted. The differences tend to lie around the selection of modalities 
ofintensified violence or force, so that the military strategy is a strategy of using 
military capabilities while the political strategy though it may invoke such 
capabilities can operate in a more dominant sense during periods of limited or 
"1 . .". 1 117 ow mtenslty VIO ence. 
B.H. Liddell Hart couples his readings of military and general history with 
his understandings from Sun Tzu, close readings of the campaigns of such 
distinguished generals as Belasarius, reflecting on Clausewitz and other writers 
on strategy .118 Hart proposes that military strategy, even ifit must accommodate 
other strategies, such as deterrence for example, is a strategy of drawing an 
aggressor into his attack, and then while he is occupied with this, to pick the 
points for counterattack. Deterrence policies are open. Military strategies depend 
upon secrecy: 
In strategy .. calculation is simpler and closer approximation to truth possible than 
in tactics. For in war, the chief incalculable is the human will, which manifests 
itself in resistance, which in turn lies in the province of tactics. Strategy has not 
to overcome resistance, except from nature. Its purpose is to diminish the possibility 
of resistance, and it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of 
movement and surprise. [p.337). (Emphasis by author). 
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During peacetime we have discovered that the strategies of opposing or rival 
states are "adversary" in nature, while it seems that the grand strategies they 
adopt are an amalgamation of all of the components of power to further national 
purpose and goalsy9 The interaction of the political and military strategies is 
familiar in state practice: the dialectical element in the working out of strategies 
of rivals tends toward an equilibrium or system of continuously evolving checks 
in terms of the weaponry, usually leading to the "deterrence" equilibrium where 
the weaponry that is balanced is perceived as weaponry of intolerable destruc-
tion.120 It is presumed that the deterrence strategy, shared by the rival states, is 
dependent upon the will of each, and that the will to invoke the weapons is 
crucial to the "credibility" of the strategy. 121 However, the actualization of the 
strategy into conduct, i.e., by way of the use of the weapons, is presumed to 
depend upon that will.122 
Deterrence according to a leading commission that considered our strategic 
forces may be identified in terms of countering the action of a rival. The extent 
to which it is applicable with economic sanctions remains uncertain, as indicated 
in the following expressed here in terms of the Soviet threat: 
Deterrence is central to the calm persistence we must demonstrate in order to 
reduce these risks [of war or military attack] ... Deterrence is not, and cannot be, 
bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, 
we must be perceived to be able, and prepared, ifnecessary, to use them effectively 
against the key elements of Soviet power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion 
amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror image of what would 
deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefS in the minds of the Soviet leaders, 
given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires 
us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering 
aggression, even in a crisis - not to determine what would deter us. 123 
Distinctions in this context of a "political" strategy of deterrence and a strategy 
of armed conduct thus tend to arise from the extent to which weapons are 
invoked. But the differences between "offensive" and "defensive" weaponry 
long largely meaningless in wartime or armed combat have less meaning during 
peacetime as well. Weapons in peacetime attain their effectiveness through the 
threats they impose and may therefore be invoked by the diplomat or ideologist, 
or for the purposes of propaganda, or to attempt to gain strategic advantage over 
one's opponent.124 The use of the nuclear weapons to back up economic 
sanctions leads to speculation: it is possible however that the deterrence equi-
librium, and the proliferation of these weapons [or the appearance of readily 
available alternatives such as chemical weapons] will lead to their having little 
impact upon such sanctions. 
The "will" of the nation to act or endure is introduced into its strategies or 
implied in them as a crucial and necessary component of economic sanctions as 
well as of warfare in general. The perception of a nation's will by Clausewitz 
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leads to his assessment of the center of gravity of a belligerent, i.e., the locus of 
its power to act or decide. Thus, in the war in Southeast Asia this may have been 
for the United States the element of public support.125 
There is a direct correlation between solid objectives and what Clausewitz 
called the "strategic center of gravity." That is the point of decision. National 
War College students recendy applied that principle to Vietnam. The group 
generally agreed that the strategic center of gravity for South Vietnam always 
was the people; not body counts on the battlefield, but the minds of the people. It 
took U.S. leaders a long time to figure that out. The primary pressure point for 
the United States was national will. The enemy found that out early, and 
continually turned the screws. No one determined the strategic center of gravity 
for North Vietnam. It may even have been in some other country. That is one 
reason why_ it was so hard for us to define decisive objectives.126 
Without the will to carry on a struggle to achieve a clearly-defined goal or 
objective, even a stronger military force lacks the social will essential to enabling 
it to endure, persist and win. Hence the notion of economic warfare, turned to 
peacetime, becomes part of a larger strategy in which targeting is upon a rival's 
economy, and therefore upon his cities and industrial areas, and, in peacetime, 
the threats can be imposed by weapons and military capabilities of all kinds. In 
the economic sanctions imposed under Security Council directives upon Iraq 
the naval forces are of particular significance for the purpose of blockade and for 
providing military threats. 
Strategic economic warfare, largely the outcome of the second World War 
when waged with air-borne delivery of weapons to attack the Gennan and 
Japanese cities and thus the economy of both countries, is likely to continue into 
future wars. The link between the political objectives and the conduct of warfare 
stressed as a fundamental principle of Clausewitz is even clearer when we turn 
to economic warfare in this sense. The arming of naval vessels with strategic 
weapons makes them an essential element both in the deterrent factor and in 
the conduct of hostilities should belligerents turn to strategic weapons. 
Strategic Economic Goals 
Economic warfare, like other measures of warfare, and the law regulating that 
warfare find their place within the larger strategy of confronting and combatting 
an enemy or rival, and within the programs instituted under that strategy to 
attain the policy objectives of warfare. Strategy even as traditionally conceived 
h mili· d 1·· al . 127 S . rall as a tary an po IOC component m common usage. trategy IS gene y 
identified as the program and plans, and operational guidelines, fonnulated and 
tested with regard to specified strategic objectives of states. 
Used in the political, or broadest, sense the concept of strategy assimilates the 
augmentation and application of national power to achieve such goals both 
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 298 
during war and peacetime. 128 When narrowed to military strategy, the plans and 
programs and operational elements include the rules of engagement of the 
military forces for achieving military objectives during combat. The broad use 
of strategy among states is associated with the larger global policy goals particular"'" 
ly of the major states, and with the actions and operations that might through 
national power achieve those goals. The actions of states are expected to 
accommodate international law and community standards, and the perspectives 
of states that make up their strategy will seek to preserve and promote the values 
prized by the state. 
It is notable that the modalities of economic warfare are readily invoked 
during wartime and peace, that they may be used in hostile actions, usually 
backed then by the use of military force, or as an unfriendly action, as in retorsion. 
Used in wartime with military force they are subject to the community standards 
generally encompassed under the principle of military necessity.129 But this 
principle leads to judgmental standards such as the principle of economy offorce 
[a fundamental principle of war applicable to the judgment and decisions of the 
commander]. According to Mahan that principle is best applied through atten-
tion to "exclusiveness of purpose." 
... [C]oncentration [a principle of war] sums up in itself all the other factors, the 
entire alphabet, of military efficiency in war. In another way, Napoleon expressed 
this in a notable saying: "Exclusiveness of purpose is the secret of great successes." 
Exclusiveness of purpose means concentration of the will upon one object to the 
exclusion of others. There is thus a concentration of mental and moral outlook, 
of resolution, as real as the physical concentration of disposable forces: and when 
the moral prepossession exists in a military man the ~hysical concentration will 
follow, as surely as any effect follows upon its cause. I 
Such "warfare" conceived in the broader sense of including economic 
sabotage and economic sanctions and actions in general uses methods that can 
strike at a nation's vulnerable technologies and economies based upon technol-
ogy [e.g., communications, computer networks, computer assisted decision 
processes], and during hostilities can check or interfere with vital lines of 
communication and instruction to naval vessels, and to the commanders in 
general of all of the military services. Economic warfare _ thuu:an be based upon 
technologies of peace turned quickly to hostile uses. 
Mahan suggests that principles fit comfortably the development of a 
"strategy," but the pressure of tactics determines their operation and application. 
The pressure of tactics is impelled by new attack scenarios adopted by belligerents 
both in their force and contingency planning, and during combat, the changes 
in the organizational base for conducting and supporting war [e.g., the massive 
industrial infrastructure], the resort to the weapons and agents to achieve their 
immediate military objectives [tactical during combat; strategic in the larger 
299 Almond 
sense]. Similarly, economic warfare operates as a prelude to hostilities, as in the 
current Iraqi situation, or accompanied by severe coercion, it is shaped by the 
attitudes toward violence rather than the attitudes toward more remote 
economic goals. 
Economic warfare undergoing change with changing technologies is thus 
brought under principles that are primarily affected by the growing content 
arising from belligerent [and even peacetime] practice of states. Hence, 
Based as Naval Strategy is upon fundamental truths, which when correctly 
formulated, are rightly called principles, these truths, when ascertained, are in 
themselves unchangeable; but it by no means follows that in elucidation and 
restatement, or by experience in war, new light may not be shed upon the 
principles, and new methods introduced into their application.131 
Naval strategy is then like other military strategies dependent upon the 
objective and the realistic attainment of the objective. The military realities 
however require attention to readiness and facilities for conducting warfare at 
great distances. According to Mahan: 
It is true ... that on a maritime theater the navy is the all-important factor; but 
in these days a navy no more than an army can stretch its lines of communication 
too far from a strong and extensive base. Its communications must be assured, 
either by overwhelming control of the sea, making it as it were its own territory; 
or else, by a well-knit line of posts properly spaced from the home territory. 132 
But the prevailing policy necessities in democratic states and even in the 
totalitarian states as they are now evolving demand substantial support by the 
public of the strategy that may involve war. Economic warfare commencing 
purposefully at an early stage may thus do two things: it can set the stage for an 
economic strategy; and it can set the groundwork for moving ahead to more 
intensive coercion if the less intensive modalities fail, or if persuasion cannot be 
adopted, and lead to the nation's goals. 
Thus, Mahan noted with regard to the Monroe Doctrine the interlocking 
themes that had commanded social support: 
The Monroe Doctrine in its beginnings was partly an expression of commercial 
interest, directed against a renewal of Spanish monopoly in the colonial system; 
it was partly military, defensive against European aggressions and dangerous 
propinqui~; partly political, in sympathy with communities struggling for 
freedom. 13 
The Chinese strategist has aptly put the fundamental objective that determines 
the goals of the military commander. With growing linkage between the 
traditional modalities of economic warfare and the shift toward strategic 
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economic warfare, these goals are the same whatever the modalities of warfare 
chosen: 
Victory is the main object in war. Jfthis is long delayed, weapons are blunted and 
morale depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. 134 
Clausewitz reached the same conclusion, stressing however that the policy 
element in undertaking war looks to policy objectives beyond those of the 
military objectives: 
Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy's forces 
as a means to a further end ... The decision by arms is for all major and minor 
operations in war what cash payment is in commerce ... Thus it is evident that 
destruction of the enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with 
which others cannot compete ... When we speak of destroying the enemy's 
forces we must emphasize that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical 
forces: the moral element must also be considered . . . That the method of 
destruction cannot fail to be expensive is understandable; other things being equal, 
the more intent we are on destroying the enemy's forces, the greater our own 
efforts must be.135 
So Clausewitz too raises the need to achieve an economy, a swiftness, and 
the shock of military effectiveness in using military forces, but his stress on 
achieving political aims compels the commander and statesman to combine 
capabilities toward making war achieve the larger global goals that make the 
sacrifice of war worthwhile.136 Into this crucible of strategy and policy states 
may invoke the modalities of economic warfare, perhaps before armed hostilities 
have begun and then during combat. And, if combat escalates, the strategy 
adopted, and implemented, is likely to tum to strategic economic warfare, 
coupling the use of strategic weapons to strategic goals that would bring an 
enemy's economy to a standstill. 
Economic Sanctions in Peacetime: Assessment 
Economic sanctions are based on economic strategies, and the application of 
economic instruments of policy, to achieve either the exclusive policy objectives 
of states or the common objectives among states for achieving global order, or 
strengthening it.137 Economic sanctions may be exercised by states individually 
or collectively pursuant to directives of the Security Council or of the regional 
organizations of which they are a member. Where invoked without armed force 
they would not constitute aggression under the United Nations definition of 
aggression.138 
Economic strategies and economic sanctions are available to states to achieve 
a variety of goals that states may seek for themselves alone, as well as the 
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far-reaching,inclusive goal of minimum order. They may enable states to prepare 
themselves for hostilities with potential enemies by weakening the economy, 
and the will, of their rivals or of states violating international law. This is one 
of the primary goals of the current economic sanctions directed at Iraq. [1990]. 
They may also constitute threats with the expectation that the violator will 
recognize the possibility that the coercion imposed by the sanction may be 
intensified to the point of hostilities , and the further expectation that the violator 
may then terminate its misconduct. They may of course be used in association 
with other strategies both in times of peace and in war, so that ideological, 
military and diplomatic strategies would then operate to reinforce each other, 
and give greater assurance of achieving the larger goals of restoring the damage 
to the global order itsel£ This too is indicative of the stated goals of states in the 
Iraqi crisis. 
Such sanctions and strategies thus may reduce the bases of belligerent power 
of an adversary - reaching to weaken his power, his wealth, and even his rectitude 
or respect within the community. But in mentioning these broad goals and the 
resort to economic sanctions, the need for analysis and consideration of the 
effectiveness of the sanctions emerges. States may be able to select between 
economic sanctions and military sanctions, but then find themselves without 
adequate assurance that the economic sanction alone is the least costly path to 
take, or that a prolonged economic sanction will achieve the desired goals, with 
the expectation being that the costs and burdens, and uncertainties, of hostilities 
can be eliminated. Or that a prolonged economic sanction might so weaken an 
adversary that a military blow after the sanction has run a considerable period 
might be more effective and less costly. 
Although there are a variety of impacts that may occur to the violator when 
a comprehensive economic sanction, or one in which the confinement of the 
violating state's economy is reasonably complete, is imposed, the primary aim 
of such a strategy is to reach either the economy or the economic activities. A 
comprehensive peace-time coalition of states invoking an economic sanction 
against a state, such as Iraq, is aiming its actions at the economy. Should the 
coalition tum to the military sanction, the goal of the economic component of 
their strategy will continue to be the economy but implemented through military 
or strategic measures. Whether the economic sanction can reach the desired 
results without escalation to intensified coercion and military force, calls for 
judgment as well as for adoption of strategies that can be readily corrected if they 
are not found to be effective. 
Monitoring economic sanctions to determine their effectiveness, the assess-
ment of the vulnerabilities of the targeted state, the assurance that a coalition of 
states will cooperate in imposing a comprehensive sanction, the imposition of 
other sanctions, are all matters that call for the closest, continuous review. 
Economic sanctions involving a large number of states are likely to call for 
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economic assistance and cooperation among the coalition to replace the 
economic benefits that had been enjoyed before the sanctions were imposed. 
The force planner concerned with the use of naval forces in this context must 
consider the resources he will shift to the economic strategy, and he must balance 
in his strategic assessment the effective use of the strategic instruments at his 
disposal. When and how much of his resources are to be devoted to strategic 
economic warfare, for example, necessarily entails consideration of the costs 
arising upon termination of the war, assuming victory, to restore an enemy 
whose economy has been severely damaged by such a strategy.139 
Economic warfare in general is premised on the expectation that states cannot 
effectively wage war if the morale of their citizens is diminished or the industrial 
structure destroyed. The uncertainties of this warfare are brought out by the 
experience of the British armed forces in the Second World War, and in 
particular the experience in using the air force as the delivery vehicle for large 
amounts of explosives and incendiary devices. The naval forces would unques-
tionably be drawn into such warfare in the future if their long-range missiles or 
off-shore bombardment capabilities were to be enlisted. 
The result of the British experience suggests that economic warfare aimed at 
strategic targets was not successful in bringing the war to an end. The extent to 
which it enabled the military actions and activities to achieve success is unclear. 
It must be emphasized that strategic economic warfare was conducted by military 
actions, primarily aircraft attacks, on economic targets behind the military lines. 
But if this warfare was questionable, the effectiveness of economic warfare in 
peacetime, such as through economic sanctions, remains in doubt. Such sanc-
tions do not have the urge of military force, nor the impacts such force would 
have on the populace and its place in compelling the termination of hostilities. 
With the brief appraisal of British practice in World War II by Professor 
D.H.N. Johnson in view, we might consider how the British policy for a strategic 
economic warfare program came about, and how it was applied. 140 The British 
policy at the beginning of the second World War can be traced to a memoran-
dum of May 2, 1928 by Lord Trenchard. Following Clausewitz, but adding a 
new dimension, the memorandum declared that force would not be ad-
ministered exclusively to destroy the opposing air forces, but to 'break down 
the enemy's means of resistance by attacks on objectives selected as most likely 
to achieve this end.141 
The attacks on other selected objectives became a matter of controversy, 
because, under the principle of economy of force, there was concern whether 
the use of scarce attack resources might better be applied to military forces 
themselves, or directly to military installations. President Roosevelt addressed 
an appeal to refrain from attacks on undefended cities, and expected both sides 
to respect this position. However, as the fighting progressed, the "seven possible 
targets" for attack drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff in January 1941 included 
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civilian morale. The others summarized by Johnson were the German air force, 
anti-invasion targets, transportation, industries, naval objectives and oil, with 
industries, transportation and 'morale' as convenient secondary targets. Morale 
was subsequendy to be linked to transportation, and then ultimately the 
economy as a whole. Yet night bombing, favored to protect the attacking forces, 
necessarily included attacks that might involve a larger area than the specific 
targets themselves. This led in Britain to debates usually on the grounds of moral 
principle and humanity. Churchill's own reflections suggesting a principle of 
reciprocity at work were reluctandy accepted by the military services, stressing 
that naval blockades during the First World War led to far more deaths or 
casualties than did the major bombing attacks of the Second World War.142 
Churchill's minute was the subject of much of the controversy: 
It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so-called 'area 
bombing' of Germany cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our 
own interests. If we come into control of an entirely ruined land, there will be a 
great shortage of accommodations for ourselves and our Allies and we shall be 
unable to get housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some 
temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. We 
must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to ourselves in the long run 
than they do to the enemy's immediate war effort.143 
'Area bombing, and now "target bombing" refer to attacks on cities or 
congested populace areas in which the indirect damage to the civilians will be 
large. But strategic economic warfare, ultimately, was to include the civilians 
themselves as targets provided they were working in the military effort. In major 
wars, this would mean the entire community. Concern with such attacks led to 
the claims of "undefended" places, of non-military objectives such as hospitals 
and schools, of "neutralized zones" during wartime or zones of protection of 
non-combatants, and even to the protection of cultural property. 
Under Protocol I, Geneva Protocols; 1977, indiscriminate attacks are 
prohibited. Such attacks are likely to include those practiced in World War II 
on urbanized areas and aimed at economic destruction. Article 51 declares in 
para. 5: 
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indis-
criminate: 
a. an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives 
located in a city, town, village, or other area containing a similar concentration 
of civilians or civilian objects; and 
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b. an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.l44 
Strategic economic sanctions, such as those that are currendy practiced with 
regard to Iraq under directives of the Security Council of the United Nations, 
are also dependent upon naval forces and naval support. The considerable 
distance to the probable field ofland combat dictates the need for an effective 
naval force, at least to ofF.;et attacks that might be land-based, or based on the 
naval forces of the aggressor, and naval forces would be needed to support such 
attacks. In this role, the navy and other military forces operate both in a deterrent 
capacity, where it is sought through the force they threaten, to prevent a war 
and gain the objectives of war, or should force be invoked to provide attacks 
that will be effective, economical and swiftly achieve a termination of the war 
with the enemy's forces destroyed. 
Compromises with these objectives or a failure to pursue the political 
objectives would be inconsistent with the teachings of Clausewitz and others. 
But experience with economic sanctions in peacetime is minimal: it might be 
argued that when such sanctions are attempted against a strong nation they may 
lead to attacks by that nation. It is possible that Japan launched its surprise attack 
on the United States in the second World War because it lacked resources, and 
sanctions seeking to prevent it from reaching those resources were viewed as 
acts amounting to war. 
The indicia of effective sanctions are found in performance. Clarification of 
goals and purpose, and the extent to which these are attained is an important 
task. The effectiveness of the economic sanctions ultimately depends upon 
whether the target state can be reached in terms of its economy, i.e., as to the 
necessities of life, the means of survival, and to some extent as to the morale of 
its citizens. The ability ofiraq to produce on its own territory adequate foodstufF.; 
or to achieve the flow of foodstufF.; and other necessities through smuggling or 
breach of the sanctions must be considered in appraising the time needed to 
achieve economic goals. It is unclear whether achieving "economic" goals is 
enough, or whether achieving them will lead to achieving other social goals as 
well. 
Whether military forces are to be disposed or maintained, or the extent to 
which this is done to ensure such sanctions, and also to assure that Iraq will not 
tum to military action is a matter for judgement to be made through those who 
participate in such things within a given state.145 Whether other sanctions, 
ideological, diplomatic or "political" should be imposed is a matter for judgment 
as well, and resort to them may lead to a more comprehensive set of objectives, 
and a more refined array of targets than those of the economic sanctions alone.146 
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Prospects for the Future 
What are the prospects for the future rules of naval warfare, and especially 
those of economic warfare at sea? These prospects depend in large measure upon 
the new modalities for exerting coercion - new military capabilities, weapons, 
and methods of attack. They also depend upon the attitudes of states toward 
public order: will they continue to struggle over widely differing perceptions 
about global order, partially guided by the United Nations Charter and inter-
national law? Or will they tum in earnest toward promoting global order under 
the United Nations Charter or otherwise? 
But formidable challenges lie ahead. Among these: naval forces are likely to 
be developed to undertake new and more difficult missions, in which the 
elements of economic warfare are commingled with those of the direct use of 
force. The graying of weaponry - submarines and surface ships alike carrying 
strategic weapons as well as weapons for their own defense, the deployment of 
submersibles, and so on will have their impact. 
Economic warfare short of war is likely to be refined: in the current crisis in 
the Middle East economic sanctions under the United Nations Charter have 
been directed through resolutions of the Security Council.147 These include the 
use of naval forces, as set forth under Resolution 655 (August 25, 1990): 
[The Security Council] calling upon those Member States cooperating with the 
Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use 
such measures commensurate to the specific circumstance as may be necessary 
under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward 
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and 
to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid 
down in resolutions 661 (1990).148 
But economic warfare claimed under the exercise of self-defense against 
aggression, or by way of reprisals, or in response to unfriendly acts by way of 
retorsion, or as ordered by the regional organizations may be anticipated. While 
naval forces operate in peacetime through presence, transit, military exercises, 
port visits and so on, it is probable that they may be used as in the past for more 
coercive measures, and that these will be directed at economic targets as well as 
the traditional military targets. 
New methods of economic warfare are likely to appear and be claimed as 
permissible in the future.149 The quarantine in the Cuban-Missile Crisis furnishes an 
example of a method designed to reach Soviet shipments of missiles exclusively, 
and thereby to escape the more comprehensive program that is associated with 
the blockade. Such an action has variously been characterized as an act of "self 
defense," a "quarantine," a "blockade" with a new and differing name, as an 
offensive act, permitted to affirm certain interests, and so on. Resolutions of the 
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United Nations General Assembly, as with its "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, 
can provide recommendations to members to act using economic or military 
sanctions, and affording legality or permissibility to such actions. These too may 
assimilate new methods of warfare. Article 94 of the United Nations Charter 
suggests that enforcement of a judgment of the International Court of Justice 
may be directed through the Security Council. As seen, this could include 
economic sanctions, enforceable through naval forces: 
[Article 94 (2)]. If any party to a case fails to perfonn the obligations incumbent 
upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment. 
Supplementary law such as that from the Briand-Kellogg Pact, coupled with 
the Budapest Articles ofInterpretations, 1934,151 must be gradually assimilated 
. h . f I h . 152 I . . al 10 t e practIce 0 states to contro t e resort to coerClve measures. nstItutIon 
arrangements must be developed and invoked to ensure consultation and 
decision-making for the community at large. Regional organizations such as 
NATO presupposed to be the appropriate check on threats of aggression must 
remain operative. 
However, the trends in law as prescribed and applied have become clear: 
belligerent actions are shaped through new methods and weapons of warfare, 
and they, in tum, continually reshape the expectations and law of neutrality, as 
well as the tolerances relating to all forms of coercion, including economic 
warfare.153 We can envisage future conferences addressing problems of this 
nature. But past practice and trends suggest that the work and drafts of such 
conferences will have little meaning unless the law that is drafted into these 
instruments is closely assimilated to the expectations of the "operators," i.e., to 
the decision-makers involved in resorting to the use of force itsel£ 154 Strong 
tendencies of such conferences and drafts to rely upon the elegance of law, 
displayed through the language that is used, and to rely upon the good faith of 
nations in adapting their practices to a set of rules, and the opposing tendencies 
of states to seek out how they intend to protect themselves or deter others against 
attacking them are primary, almost primordial, instincts almost always taking 
precedence when the war crimes courts meet or when the prize courts determine 
and apply the applicable law. 
States concerned with economic warfare must give closer attention to the 
implications of economic measures and methods that are used in war, or in 
peacetime to gain strategic advantage with regard to future wars. Strategic 
objectives have appeared creating a shift in the perspectives about such warfare, 
and about the methods to be invoked. The shift has led to an increased tendency 
to use forcible measures of economic warfare, or, at least, to include under 
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forcible measures of warfare, the economic targets, or the economy selected as 
a strategic target. Additionally, states are faced with a form of economic warfare 
when terrorists shift to targets critical to the economy, or where "low-intensity" 
conflict erupts with the same tendencies. Attacks by such groups intended 
to upset a nation's economy by striking, for example, at nuclear power 
plants, or other facilities essential to the economy are among the future 
prospects. Similarly, the concerted acts of espionage and industrial theft enable 
states that practice these activities to gain the economic benefits of their rivals at 
little or low cost, and also to gain knowledge about vulnerabilities in the 
economies of those rivals readily exploitable during wartime by military 
measures. ISS 
The major conclusion regarding economic warfare at sea relates to the 
changing content of the perspectives of neutrality. Traditional neutrality has 
given way in the two World Wars to a point of non-belligerency, characterized 
by the tolerances of the belligerents and neutrals with respect to how much 
discriminatory action will be accepted of neutral states, and when breaches are 
such that the neutral will be treated as a belligerent. To this extent, the traditional 
perspectives and law remain unchanged. However, under the traditional 
perspectives there was a clear line between belligerency and non-belligerency, 
but this has given way to the ambiguities of state practice. Under the traditional 
law the standards of impartiality and other standards determined with some 
degree of clarity and objectivity whether the neutral state had crossed the line 
of belligerency. 
Now there are varying degrees of non-belligerency. Moreover, non-bel-
ligerency [neutrality in the changing current sense] is subservient to perspectives 
about global order and practices aimed at global order. These new perspectives 
give the neutral a claim at least that it can resort to conduct, formerly treated as 
contrary to its neutral responsibilities, and insist that it remains neutral and in 
support of the global order. Such a claim would include the argument that other 
states should take a similar position, i.e., all states are then aligned against the 
aggressor in behalf of the public order. It would mean, if fully carried out, that 
the determination of aggression could be widely shared among the states not at 
war. This is at best an assumption. 
However, new perspectives have appeared regarding the use of force under 
the global organization [United Nations], and with regard to aggression. The 
participants that are not belligerents have a new role: there is a stronger case for 
them to resort to force for self defense, collective self defense, or promotion of 
the global order, and while acting individually claiming their acts to be erga 
omnes.
IS6 
The role of the Security Council is likely to change, if, of course, expectations 
among states show the willingness to defer to an international organ with the 
powers it has. These interacting elements show strong trends toward public 
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order, even when states resort to the immediate threat by way of self defense. 
Yet the trends are still emerging: states have no compulsion, no globally imposed 
responsibility to act against aggressors without the mandate of the Security 
Council. But neutrality becomes important only as a statement of the factual or 
interactive situation among states during belligerency: states are not belligerents 
if the belligerents do not treat them as such. Hence the subjectivities of states 
are the crucial element: the state subjected to aggression is the major starting 
point for determining aggression. Its actions in retaliation are most likely to be 
affirmed by the global community. The states claiming neutrality or belligerency 
are also a point offocus as to their standing, except that competing or conflicting 
claims and policies are more likely to be raised. The real change in trends is 
toward the notion of a collective perspective about both public order and the 
support of public order by "neutrals" in war, or at times of aggression. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of this analysis must consider two major issues. First. What 
can we expect from state ,tolerances with regard to economic warfare in the 
future? Second. What are our expectations about invoking economic sanctions, 
through the directives and resolutions of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, and about the effectiveness of both such sanctions and economic 
warfare? The answers to these questions based upon the preceding analysis lead 
us to conclude that economic warfare is a means ofimposing either persuasion 
or coercion or both aimed primarily at the economies of rival states. 
The effectiveness of such warfare will depend upon the impact of the coercion 
or sanction upon the targeted state, to wit, upon its economy, its economic 
activities, and its trade and commerce with other states. States with strong 
domestic economies that are not dependent upon other states supporting their 
economic base are those most likely to be able to protect that base. 
The law regulating and governing economic warfare is an emerging law, 
reflecting the changing tolerances among states. Focus must be upon the 
operational element in law, that is the element that links the emergence oflaw 
with changing behavior patterns and tolerances associated with new weapons 
and methods of attack. What this leads us to conclude, in short, is that the law 
itself including the law of war is affected by the actions of states: new law is 
established through the tolerances arising with regard to attacks and weapons, 
old law is strengthened and the actions themselves are instruments both for 
enforcing and promoting the law in general. 
Some of the conclusions in greater detail: 
- Economic warfare at sea may be conducted by enemy states either by attacking 
the means by which an enemy's goods are transported, stored, or produced, or by 
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other coercive measures; prevailing trends suggest that economic warfare may 
include the targeting of the economy at large including its industrial base, and the 
civilian population involved in the production of goods and services essential for 
the military activities. 
- To this end, naval vessels have been designed as platforms for strategic attacks, 
both with respect to the missiles that can be delivered, and with respect to the 
aircraft that they carry; such attacks were conducted in the Gulf War. 
- Changing perspectives aroused by new weapons, new methods of attack, and 
the greater destructiveness of weapons affect the military and economic instru-
ment, supporting the trends toward attacking the economic base of rivals, in part 
through working with the elasticity and the complementary balancing in applica-
tion of the law of war principles relating to indiscriminate attacks, indirect damage 
and destruction, proportionality, and necessity. The attempts in treaties and 
agreements to reach the impact of change, e.g., in the Declaration of St. 
Petersburg, in the Geneva Protocols of1977 [regarding attacks, precautions, and 
so on] have not been tested in belligerency and are likely to remain moribund. 
- Economic sanctions against states, established under directives of the Security 
Council of the United Nations, are largely the creature of the determinations and 
decisions of that organ, but they may be aimed at a state's economy, or at its 
economic activities, including transport of goods, or any combination of these. 
- As with other areas of warfare, the law and the emerging law of economic warfare 
have been affected by rapidly changing technologies, improved military organiza-
tion capable of drawing upon those technologies, access to the plans of the enemy 
through improved intelligence, and the growing sophistication of the military 
capabilities and the methods of warfare. 
- As with other modalities and instruments of warfare, the means or modalities of 
economic warfare are not fixed, but are adapted, as needed, with regard to the 
missions or targets involved, and adapted to the needs or necessities as perceived 
in the changing military situations; economic warfare is coupled with forcible 
measures that vary from minor to severe coercion, evidenced by low to high 
intensity of violence; 157 economic warfare at sea is perceived as a major component 
of economic warfare in general, and the methods of such warfare are and will be 
refined in the future in order to improve their effectiveness in achieving policy 
goals of the participants and those involved. 
- Economic warfare at sea has traditionally been warfare through naval forces 
aimed at blockade, interference or countering the enemy's commerce and trade, 
including that of neutrals supporting the enemy; submarines and submersibles will 
be important components of such warfare, particularly in strategic as well as the 
traditionally economic warfare at sea and over land, and will include air blockades, 
and perhaps blockades through the targeting of ballistic or cruise missiles, or 
through electronic warfare techniques. Economic warfare is most likely to be 
affected by changing perspectives concerning the conduct of warfare, and there-
fore the operational law is likely to include much that is "soft" law - or law 
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evolving as belligerency progresses, rather than hard law or rules found applicable 
without change or affect on the policy involved in such rules. Much of this 
operational law of economic warfare is applicable to all methods of warfare. 158 
- State practice relating to wars in the last two centuries shows that economi:: 
warfare has had at best a limited impact upon weakening the enemy. However, 
this may be attributed to success of the targeted state in producing its goods, or in 
securing its goods from others. As economic warfare turns toward strategic 
economic warfare, all of the military services will participate in using strategic 
weapons to weaken an enemy's economy and for improving the strategic position 
of the state that invokes economic measures. As economic warfare is expanded 
conceptually and operationally to include strategic and tactical strikes at an enemy's 
economy, or involves more effective collective economic sanctions including 
those marshalled under the Security Council to reach a target state's total 
economy, the effectiveness of such warfare in achieving military and political 
objectives, as well as economic [economy-destroying] objectives are likely to 
increase, and the law relating to such warfare become more settled. 
- Economic methods of warfare that operate by persuasion, i.e., by means in which 
force is not used or threatened, have not been widely used; however, as the 
economic base and the economies of states become more complex, involving a 
greater interaction of decisions, and more vulnerable to interferences with their 
technologies relating to communications, production of goods, transport of goods 
and so on, the economies will also become vulnerable targets, more readily subject 
to interference and even lasting damage. 
- Law is appraised in the global community through a consideration of the entire 
context of expectations, including state practice, custom and customary interna-
tionallaw, the decisions and policies of public officials, the activities of states and 
so on; accordingly, the application oflaw and its interpretation are likely to meet 
with the ambiguities, changing methods of warfare, changing tolerances among 
states as to what is pennitted as warfare becomes more intense, and to elude the 
precision and certainty usually sought in the law itself: as states shift toward 
doctrines of strategic deterrence through threats regarding the industrial base and 
the industrial population, it is probable that they will make these threats effective 
in combat. If attacks upon cities and the industrial base are considered part of 
economic warfare - i.e., where the object of the attack, the economy, defines the 
method of attack, economic warfare, this would stimulate the present shift from 
economic warfare as a method operable in itself that is, as the means either short 
of war or as a non-forcible means during war to a method that embraces forcible 
means to achieve its goals. 159 This would lead to the unequivocal application of 
the laws of war and the standards of military necessity to such action. 
- The applicable and operational law relating to economic warfare ranges into 
areas of substantial discretion: hence we can anticipate that as such methods of 
warfare are more frequently invoked, there will be refinements in economic 
warfare in which the attacks or methods of warfare are found pennissible as the 
discretionary acts of governments in attacking each other. Further refinements 
may arise where the resort to force is authorized by the legal authority of the global 
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community, to wit, through directives of the Security Council, or in conformance 
with recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. l60 
- The differences allegedly arising between offensive and defensive warfare are 
minimal because during combat, and in the force planning relating to preparation 
for combat, states employ similar methods of warfare, weapons, and tactics for 
each. Offensive warfare appears in the form of an assertive action in taking a 
military object, while defensive warfare assumes a reactive action in defending 
one, but combat tends to oscillate between the two forms of action. This 
perspective regarding weapons targeted for deterrence is already clear in the SALT 
agreements: the United States and the Soviet Union, though they purported to 
reach controls on "offensive strategic weapons," failed to define the weapons as 
such except by arbitrary stipulation and targets, and ultimately they were com-
pelled to recognize that such weapons might be used interchangeably by way of 
tactics and strategy with weapons that counter the offensive weapons [the strategic 
defense weapons].161 
- In adopting strategic ballistically delivered weapons, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have adopted a military perspective for outer space: transit by such 
weapons, testing of the delivery systems, and so on is not banned. 
- The application oflaw and the standards from the law of war are imposed on 
economic warfare where accompanied by the use offorce, or particularly where 
the objectives of economic warfare are achieved through the use of force; where 
there is a clear separation of economic measures from forcible measures, there is 
a wide discretion in their use, and their use is largely judged as acts of unfriendly 
relations or where made in response as forms of retorsion. 162 
- The relation of economic warfare to neutrality is a relation that involves the 
separation of belligerent and non-belligerent states; but this relation is subject to 
confusion because the status of war, and the status of neutrality, are matters that 
are in a continuous state of flux, particularly where the Security Council acts, so 
that neutrality itself is affected; in policy and in strict terms oflaw, the law itself 
is in a state of flux. 163 
- The operational element involving the decisions to use force, or the decisions 
in how it is used, are of critical importantance in forming the policy that each of 
the states involved in belligerency expects to be the governing policy and source 
of authority both with regard to warfare in general, and with regard to economic 
warfare. There are immediate changes in the law that regulates warfare and the 
use of weapons reflecting changes in the conduct ofhostilities.l64 
- Economic warfare is a strategy that may draw upon either the economic 
instrument of policy or the military instrument or both; deterrence of rival states 
is sought by demands imposed through coercion, and coercion may be imposed 
by a single state, a group of states, or under the direction of the Security Council 
to achieve deterrence, prevention, or the restoration or rehabilitation of damage 
caused by the state that has violated international law. 
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Economic warfare demands analysis of the operational element - the 
modalities and changing modalities for imposing coercion, and the prescriptive 
and normative elements - the authority and control imposed under law upon 
the policies, strategy and decision of the commander in warfare is in the strategic 
terms of reference. 
As noted above, economic warfare demands analysis of the operational 
element - the modalities and changing modalities for imposing coercion, and 
the prescriptive and normative elements - the authority and control imposed 
under law upon the policies, strategy and decisions of the commander in warfare. 
Future developments will therefore range into the interaction of law, in part 
through anticipatory efforts in the adoption of "new" law, with the military 
operations and activities.165 The behavior of states during warfare is in the 
strategic terms of reference either "tactical", involving activities in which states 
are accommodating and opposing the policies and demands of each other, and 
"strategic" when they strengthen or add to the constitutive base of the public 
order. 
But analyses of the policies and strategies of states, and their behavior reveal 
a factor of great importance: strategy with its policies, plans and programs, and 
its implementing strategies may adopt programs based upon naked power or 
upon law. But strategy, like deterrence, is policy oriented and policy directed, 
and expected under law to draw upon effective power, in the context oflegal 
order.166 Strategy in the operational phase depends upon perspectives at a given 
time, so that the objectives or principles of strategy may continue to have their 
impact, but new objectives may arise. Command of the sea thus is displaced by 
a strategy for strategic economic warfare.167 Hence states that seek to strengthen 
law and the global legal order are certain to invoke law and appraise the applicable 
law in developing their strategy. This is evident in such activities as the drafting 
of rules of engagement applicable to the use of military forces.168 
We can therefore assume that as states move toward a common legal order 
their strategy and strategies for using force will draw increasingly upon common 
perspectives about law, but while we can assume this, it would be incautious to 
presuppose law by the drafting of agreements or the formulation of resolutions 
in the global institutions. Law-making in this large and changing context will 
gain strength only if we recognize that it is law-making of a legislative nature, 
and that the legislation among states is the continuous application of practice 
imposed both through treaties and custom, and that the two necessarily interact 
and in these dangerous realms continuously throw up choices for the policy-
makers. The changes considered in this paper particularly as we shift to the 
awesome area of strategic economic policy involve the situations of choice and 
the means to correct decisions that have gone awry. 
A detailed regulation of economic warfare as such has not appeared in the 
practice among states. The general principles are those applicable to warfare in 
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general, relating to legitimate targets, force or coercion proportionately applied 
[often by the parallel use of military measures], and so on. As this inquiry suggests 
the reason for this is that the modalities of economic warfare, like that of warfare 
in general, evolve from the perspectives and tolerances of states about such 
warfare, and in particular, about the objectives that they are seeking. When they 
shift from specific identifiable economic targets or economic activities to the 
economy as a whole, then economic warfare and military warfare tend to merge 
as they did in the second World War. The participants expect at this stage that 
the war has intensified and that the stakes have increased. The participants expect 
greater violence and then exercise it, and the cycles escalate with growing 
intensity and growing expectations. The participants resort to new strategies and 
intensify those that they have adopted, especially in terms of the destructiveness 
of the war they have unleashed. 
For this reason, the conclusion is reached in this paper that what we refer to 
as economic warfare is likely to shift from concepts of identifiable targets to 
concepts of the entire support structure essential to conducting hostilities, and 
targets shift to energy sources, railroads, and the infrastructure components of 
the community at large. This was even recognized at the Nuremberg Trials. 
Attempts to halt this trend have appeared, to be sure, but these have not 
established a foothold that would make them secure as the enforceable law. Thus, 
the provisions in the Geneva Protocols of 1977 to refrain from attacking energy 
sources and provisions for new protections of the environment and so on have 
been offered to strengthen the community attitudes toward humanitarian 
protections. 
Economic sanctions, employing strategies of the global community, are aimed 
at the use of the economic instrument to manipulate the policies of others, to 
influence their decisions, and to reach community goals, pursuant to community 
standards. The economic instrument for both the sanctions and warfare may be 
coercive or non-coercive, as indicated earlier, or states may mix them together, 
always with the policy objectives in view. Economic warfare leads our perspec-
tives toward the economy as a fundamental or crucial base of power, so that 
states that seek to destroy that base will tend even as in the wars of Greeks, 
Persians and Romans to destroy those they conquer, or subdue their inhabitants. 
As the Gulf War has shown, our present attitudes reflect the hope that the 
calculus of risk and benefit involved in resorting to sanctions will be favorable 
in every sense: the costs will be reduced, human suffering eliminated or 
minimized, and so on. But economic warfare alone has not appeared in practice 
to have been effective, unless military measures accompany that practice. And 
economic sanctions set forth in the United Nations Charter as a strategy to 
invoke, are subjected to the caveat that if they are not perceived as effective, 
they will be accompanied by military sanctions. Economic strategies then may 
be applied before hostilities, during hostilities, and after hostilities, fashioned as 
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necessary. to achieve desired outcomes. All of these features are illustrated in the 
Gulf War, and open our inquiry in the future toward clarifying change in such 
strategies.169 
While we can consider trends - whether they shift toward or away from 
enlarging warfare by enlarging the economic objectives and hence the measures 
to be adopted in war - we cannot predict the outcomes.170 It would be foolhardy 
to predict the future of state practice in warfare - or in economic warfare - in 
view of the changing conditions and relations that affect the policies of states. 
As Churchill said in his eulogy to Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 
November 12, 1940: 
It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be 
intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of 
events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have 
been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has 
lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is 
another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of 
the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale 
gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide 
to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and 
sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this 
shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the 
upsetting of our calculations, but with this shield, however the fates may play, we 
march always in the ranks ofhonor.171 
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I. Captain Hugh F. Lynch, in his paper on the "strategic imperatives" relating to economic warfare at 
sea, purposefully limits his inquiry into economic warfare in a warfighting context. This of course is the 
traditional contexr, premised on the expectation of strongly armed belligerents with strong navics that they 
could "reduce the enemy's warfighting potcntial" by rcaching that part of his economic power involved in 
his trade and access to goods across national borders. The term "impcrativc" is uscd to idcntify priorities in 
military objectives. The author has a companion papcr to this, scc Harry H. Almond, Jr., An Assessment of 
fronomi, W(/ifa~: Dcvclopmtlltsfronr til, Pcr.sian Gllif31 Va.J. ofInt'l L. 645-672, (1991). 
2. See Ken Dooth on the diplomatic instrument: Law, Force and Diplomacy at Seas, (1985); for a vicw 
by implication that the entirc economy gradually vcrges on bccoming a target for warfare, blurring the 
Jines of discriminate warfarc, 1M.Shulman, Lcamillg to Uvc witll Amlloritarian Regimes, 55 Foreign Affairs 
325,337 (1977). Shulman notes that if our goal is to protect the cconomy, that of the aggrcssor is to attack 
it. 
3. Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth, 133 ct seq., (1973). 
4. ld, at 136. 
5. The changing methods of warfare, new weapons and agents used in attacks and hostilitics, and changcs 
in the organiz.atioll of invoking violence havc had their impacts leading to change ill perspcctives about 
neutrality as wen as economic warfare, and they arc indeed intcrrelated. As Myres S. McDougaland Aorentino 
P. Feliciano have indicated in their Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961), the notions of neutrality 
had already begun to wear undcr thc practice of World War I, and wcre replaced by qualifications of neutrality: 
"absolute neutrality," "qualified neutrality," "non-participation,' and 'non-belligerency" were terms intended 
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to suggest policies that did not fit easily into the older notions of neutrality. This change, considered in depth 
in McDougal and Feliciano, was outlined in Lassa Oppenheim's International Law (1952) immediately after 
the second World War. 
6. Expected patterns of behavior may be initiated or directed, so to speak, by the adoption of policies 
regarding coercion. Legal regulation of coercion imposed through economic measures invokes the same 
general standards as are used with military coercion or force, to wit, the principles associated with necessity, 
proportionality, and legitimacy of target. These principles are expressed in general language, and 
they are formulated for precise situations by accommodating to the conditions to which they are 
applied. Necessity for high intensity use of violence will differ and be less subject to constraint in state 
practice than situations in which the violence released and the conditions applicable to the use of force 
are less. Distinctions may also be made between the use of these principles when the time of reference 
differs, i.e., the principles are under closer constraints at the initiation of aggression and with regard to 
responses to aggression than during hostilities or warfare. To make states more accountable there have 
been a number of proposals, enlarging upon the just war principles, to prevent precipitous or unconsidered 
uses offorce, and to encourage a weighing of the factors that ought, by common sense, be assessed, 
even when the time is short. Speeches by former Secretary of Defense, Weinberger, and former 
Secretary of State, Shultz, suggest that there is no established policy or standards for making these assessments. 
Weinberger's six tests for using combat forces lean toward introducing major public participation, and 
toward making the determination about outcomes and success in achieving them, while Shultz is bent on the 
timely use of power justified by those uses offorce where we are on the side of the good. These positions and 
debates on them appear in Ernest W. Lefever, ed., Ethics and American Power (1985), and the just war 
component is considered in A. Sabrosky & R.L. Sloane, The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the 
"Weinberger Doctrine" (1988). The proposals for a checklist for decision makers is found in nearly every 
manifestation in which coercion or force is to be invoked, or where in on going hostilities new injections of 
force are intended. Cj. Nanda, discussed in Richard B. Lillich, Humani/ariall In/erven/ion, in John N. Moore, 
ed., Law and Civil War in the Modem World, 229, 248 (1974). [For forcible humanitarian intervention, 
Nanda calls for consent of the government involved; limited humanitarian purpose; duration of mission limited 
to accomplish limited objectives; limited use of coercive measures; and lack of other means to achieve 
objectives.] -
7. Numerous writers have taken the view that economic warfare is to be broadly construed. &e 
Williams, 15 Economic Intelligence and Economic Warfare, in publication oflCAF (1954); M. Reder of 
Stanford University noted: 
In any prolonged military struggle, the ability of a nation to survive and prevail obviously depends 
upon the extent to which it can continue to produce military equipment and sustain its population 
and armed forces. In the context of such a struggle, economic warfare is simply a matter of reducing 
the enemy's capacity to survive and preventing him from reducing yours. Reder, Economic Warfare: 
Concept and Potential (1962). [The entire paper pursues this larger perspective]. Of particular interest 
see Yaun-li Wu, Economic Warfare (1952). Wu states that the economic measures of warfare are 
"those international economic measures that through the play of economic forces could directly or 
indirectly reduce the economic strength, hence the war potential, of the enemy relative to our own." 
At 6 he differentiates between economic warfare in terms of the time of relations, i.e., those during 
military conflict and all others. 
8. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (1961). 
[hereincifter McDougal and Feliciano] &e especially the chapter on neutrality, of major relevance because 
economic war and the law of economic warfare, are found fiom the crosscurrents of perspectives about 
neutrality, warfare in general, and the specific problems of such measures as blockade, blacklisting, and so on. 
It is noteworthy that there are examples in history of nations destroying their rivals and leaving no trace. The 
attack on Carthage and its destruction nearly achieved this in recent history. It is possible that Nazi Germany 
had such objectives in view, at least with the peoples of some nations. 
9. The economy or economic base of power ofa nation is in modem warfare one of the targets 
of attack: though seemingly protected through the "humanitarian" laws relating to prohibitions against 
indiscriminate attacks against the civilians and civilian objects, the targets of strategic weapons, and the attacks 
mounted against cities, are clearly attacks intended to disable and breakdown the economy. The overall 
perspective of what constitutes such an economy, in military terms, is caught by Knorr: 
Economic military potential is determined by the composition of resources as well as by their 
over-all magnitude. The production, maintenance, ~nd use of armed forces require a variety of goods 
and services •••. Most demanding are very complex weapon systems .•• which are within reach only 
of countries possessing the most highly developed technology. As GNP is an index of a country's 
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aggre~te resources, so the composition of output reflects the structure of capacity. The composition 
of the national product is determined by three conditions of supply - manpower,natural resources, and 
man-made resources (capital and technology) - and by the structure of demand. Klaus Knorr, supra 
note 3 at 50. 
And in 2 Enqc/optdia of Sodal &ienas 90 Edwin R.A. Seligman, ed., (1930): "War, notwithstanding its 
numerous other affiliations, must be considered as a form of economic activity, for most wars or raids among 
primitive people are waged for the acquisition or retaliatory destruction of property, including the values 
inherent in human life." While applied to primitive people, the impacts of this activity in modem warfare 
remain largely the same. 
10. Economic sanctions guided by the U.N. Security Council were imposed upon Iraq in the Gulf War 
of 1991. In his interview with U.S. Ambassador Glaspie, Hussein pointed out: "There is nothing left for us 
to buy from America. Only wheat. Because every time we want to buy something they say it is forbidden. I 
am afraid that one day you will say 'You are going to make gunpowder out of wheat.'" Citation in Nicah L. 
Silty & Christopher Cerf, ed., The Gulf War Reader 128 (1991). [Hereinofter Silty and Cerf] Hussein also 
referred to Kuwait's intention to produce oil in excess of OPEC understandings as "some brothers are fighting 
an economic war a~inst us. And that not all wars use weapons and we re~rd this kind of war as a military 
action a~inst us." id., at 131. His final remarks, though cryptic, suggested that the military option a~inst 
Kuwait would be imposed on him if Kuwait did not change its policy. id., at 133. The sanctions of the United 
Nations commencing with Resolution 661, 6 August 1990, were aimed at cutting off trade with Iraq. Various 
individuals argued that sanctions should be tried, and were even likely to work. See statements by former 
Chairman, Joint ChiefS of Staff, Adm. WilliamJ. Crowe,Jr., in Sifry & Cerf, at 234,236: 
In other words, I would argue that we should give sanctions a fUr chance before we discard them. 
I personally believe they will bring him [Hussein] to his knees ultimately, but I would be the first to 
admit that is a speculative judgment. If, in £act, the sanctions will work in twelve to eighteen months 
instead of six months, a trade off of avoiding war, with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties, would 
in my estimation be more than worth it. (From Testimony to Sen. Armed Services Committee, Nov. 
28,1990.) 
Henry Kissinger observed that "the route of sanctions and the military option can be pursued up to a certain 
point simultaneously," and then it would be left to the military instrument cited, Sifry & Cerf, at 241. Brzezinski 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 5, 1990 recommended a phased step-wise 
approach, but with stress on economic sanctions, and a warning a~inst war cited Silty & Cerf, at 251-54; 
Jimmy Carter on October 22, 1990 recommended negotiation, with King Hussein as the "key leader"in this 
effort ciud Silty & Cerf, at 225-27; and numerous other commentators and experts speaking before the Senate 
and House committees reinforced the views taken with studies purporting to show the effectiveness of 
sanctions. The attitude toward sanctions and easing Hussein toward the desired results may have conditioned 
his resolve, according to The Economist, Kuwait: How the West Blundered, cited Sifry & Cerf at 99-106. President 
Bush stuck mainly to the threat to use military force, and, of course, then resorted to it. &e his speech of 
November 8, 1990, cited Silty & Cerf, at 228. 
11. The term "economic sanctions" is generally used to embrace "techniques and strategies for supporting 
public order," such as those adopted by the Security Council under its mandate in the United Nations Charter 
to maintain international peace and security. As Reisman indicates: "They [sanctions] cannot be divorced from 
the sociopolitical context in which they operate because they are integral to it." Economic sanctions have 
evolved to become strategies applicable during the entire spectrum of relations among states, and differ during 
peace and war largely to the extent that in wartime, the economic sanctions may be accompanied by military 
sanctions. And economic warfare traditionally part of the conduct of hostilities applies similar strategies as those 
applied in peace time, except for the qualifications arising from the greater intensity of violence: the targets 
selected, the destruction attempted, and the intensity of the strategies applied are likely to vary. &e W. Michael 
Reisman, Sanctions and EnJorument, International uw Essays, 381, 383, 384 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael 
Reisman eds., 1981). The term "enforcement" according to Reisman "particularizes: a public order sanctioning 
system, i.e., it is a specific assembly of sanctioning programs designed to realize, in value terms, an identifiable 
authoritative prescription." Id., at 405. 
12. Closer attention to economic warfare and to the strategies of the targeting of the economies 
and goods of rival states is likely to have its impact upon military and diplomatic strategies, in large 
part because such attention will have its impacts upon the intelligence capabilities. Intelligence, in the 
largest perspective, comprises "the ~thering, evaluation and dissemination of information relevant to 
decision-making, and may include prediction based on such information, as well as planning for future 
contingencies." For analysis see Myres S. McDougal, et.al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 
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International Law Essays, 287 (1981). It is widely accepted that a substantial element ofintelligence gathering 
is that focused on "economic" and "social" data, their evaluation, and the appraisal of their impact upon a 
nation's power. 
13. Maritime strategy is generally formulated as a strategy of naval warfare, serving in the larger context 
of hostilities. A more complete perspective would embrace economic warfare, including the enlarged notion 
suggested in this paper, and the effect of such warfare in an enlarged perspective to deny or interfere with a 
rival's logistics, the capabilities to provide the material to its military forces, and the extent to which it can 
protect itself against attacks on its logistics and supply lines. Francis J. West, Jr. observes that a "Maritime 
Strategy is based upon concepts which transcend naval considerations," and citing Dr. Robert Wood of the 
Naval War College, states "any deterrence strategy that does not consider how the war will be fought and 
terminated is a hollow shell." With the shift to conventional wars; 
The U.S. naval focus has been on persuading all U.S. Services that the issue is not a force structure 
debate. Rather, it is concerned \vith the need to develop a conventional warfighting concept, because 
the initiation of nuclear war is both militarily insensible and morally bankrupt - especially when 
rhetorically cited as a reason why wealthy nations do not have to provide prudendy for their common 
defense by conventional means. FrancisJ. West,Jr. U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning, Naval Forces 
and Western Securiry, 2,8 (1987). 
14. For a study of the strategic framework, .<ee especially Sun Tzu, The Art of War 63-84 (Griffith, trans., 
1963,1976 (Pbk]). The subject of strategy is of great importance, but ancillary, to this inquiry. &e Basil H. 
Liddell Hart, Strategy - the Indirect Approach, (1954). For a general overview of the larger policy arena, see 
Harold D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (1935). 
15. Cf.Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 99 (1911) who notes: 
Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure, at least in the modem 
conception of war, should only begin after decisive victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. 
Indeed such pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek .•. [that] interference 
with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting the secondary economic 
pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are 
not decided exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less important. When other 
things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. It has even many times redressed an unfavorable 
balance of armed force and given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which 
we are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the 
most effective means we can employ to this end against a maritime State is to deny him the resources 
of sea-borne trade. 
16. In the "Crowe Memorandum" issued in 1906 by then Mr. Eyre Crowe from the British Foreign 
Office (Reprinted in Wishy, ed., The Western World in the Twentieth Century 1961) noted that ever since 
the writings of Mahan it was widely recognized among strategists that sea power "is more potent than land 
power, because it is as pervading as the element in which it moves and has its being:" 
Its formidable character makes itself felt the more direcdy that a maritime State is, in the literal 
sense of the word, the neighbor of every country accessible by sea. [d., at 74. 
The primary thrust of the Crowe memorandum is to support England as the fulcrum to ensure a balancing of 
power against the outbreak of major hostilities, but he builds England's power upon its strength as a sea power. 
Crowe's memorandum supports the doctrine that a nation like Britain, to exercise its role, must have power 
in being: "the only check on the abuse of political predominance •.. has always consisted in the opposition 
of an equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defense." [d., at 75. 
17. For an analysis of the Vietnam War applying for the analytical framework the military principles of 
war, see Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (1984). Summers lists them 
under the objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and 
simplicity. He also mentions planning, force planning and contingency planning as analytical components of 
preparations or readiness for war. 
18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War 605 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., 1976). 
Clausewitz observed that the concept of war is that it is a "branch of political activity" and is "in no sense 
autonomous." [d. The link of policy cannot be severed from action, and the link oflaw to policy is fully 
established. 
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19. States operating under directives of the Security Council of the United Nations, may be directed 
under Article 42 to: 
••• take such action by air, sea, orland forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, 
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 41 includes the power to direct actions to disrupt economic relations, communications, and so on. 
20. The "principles" of war such as economy offorce, objective, offensive and so on are designed to 
reflect state practice, experience and expectations in resort to the traditional military instruments of war. 
However, they have their counterparts in resort to economic warfare. &e generally U.S. Department of the 
Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 
(NWP 9) (REV. A) FMFM 1-10, (1989), ch. 5. These principles are largely summed up under economy and 
efficiency, but they separately provide indicia, and lead in the military literature to "lessons learned", or to 
rules of engagement, all of vital, operational importance in the conduct of hostilities. 
21. CJ. Derek W. Bowett, Self Defense in International Law 24 (1958) (hereinafter Bowett) • 
• • • there is something to be said for the view that economic or ideological aggression can be 
detrimental to a state's security and, if illegal, as dangerous a violation of the state's essential rights as 
the use or threat of force. 
Bowettwould thus permit, in the appropriate situations, the use offorce for "economic" aggression, assuming 
it meets the standards of necessity, proportionality and relevance of target. 
22. For an important assessment of this matter see McDougal & Feliciano supra note 8, at 196-202. These 
are problems that overlap aggression as well as the issue as raised during armed combat. The two authors citing 
Bowett, supra note 21, at 202, n.182 observe. 
When the delict does not involve force or the threat offorce, it would similarly seem arbitrary to 
deny to the defending state the right to use force in defence of its rights as a matter of fixed principle • 
• • • The use offorce as a reaction to a delict not involving force will scarcely ever be "proportionate" 
but there is no rule oflaw to say it can never be so. Bowett supra note 21, at 24. 
The two authors continue in the note: 
To accept Dr. Bowett's position is not to open a Pandora's box of real as distinguished from supposed evils. 
The tests of "necessity" and "proportionality" are not in any greater degree susceptible of abuse here than in 
other contexts, if the reviewing decision-makers desire to safeguard them from subverting misuse. Susceptibility 
to abuse is a common property of all legal standards and rules. 
Coercion, they observe, is inevitable in state practice; community policy does not and cannot reach it and 
prohibit it, "without attempting to impose moral perfection, not to mention social stagnation, on humanity." 
!d., at 197. The expectations of the target state are controlling however, and, in any event, Article 2(4) of the 
Charter does not exhaust the competence of the global community to intervene itself for police measures. 
[Id., at 200, paraphrased]. They warn however against adopting such funiliar phrases as "substantial" and 
"extensive" to characterize the coercion and the bright line change to the permissibility of using force. Id., at 
199. 
23. The strategies of economic warfare must be judged against two categories: the strategy itself may 
involve an economic measure, such as freezing funds or bank accounts, or it may be an economic objective, 
later described in this paper as including the enemy's economy, and drawing that into the category of a 
legitimate military objective. Thus, the base for strategic strikes at the cities could be laid down as a strike for 
an legitimate object of attack. ExpeCt:ltions thus arose as to such strikes and to future strikes of this nature from 
the practice in the second World War. The Nuremberg Trials did not condemn such practices as such. 
24. Reprisals are introduced to promote public order, and have an enforcing function as well as a punitive 
or correcting function. Moreover, their existence and their use also carry with them a deterrence function: 
states do not usually want to suffer a reprisal because the actions taken tend to be by methods of war that are 
not usually tolerable to themselves or their populations. Reprisals may be invoked at any time, wartime or 
peacetime. CJ. Naulilaa Incident, Portugal-Germany, Arbitral Decision of 31 July 1928, 8 Recueil des Decisions 
des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, 409, 422-425. Briggs indicates in a note that reprisals may extend to display 
of military or naval force, embargo, boycott, pacific blockade, bombardment or military occupation of territory. 
Law of Nations 958 (Herbert W. Briggs, ed., 2d ed., 1952). 
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25. The "Martens" clause in the Preamble to The Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 refers to the 
obligation of states to conform with practices expected among civilized peoples including "the laws of humanity 
and the dictates of public conscience." See also Article 22 of the Hague Regulations annexed to the Convention 
No. IV. These anticipate that the conduct of hostilities is to be regulated underlaw, but mil to provide pointers 
to the maintenance of public order. Such provisions were intended to reach technological developments in 
warfare that might not have been codified or adopted as customary international law. 
26. For analysis, comment and examples see The Naulilaa Arbilration, supra note 24; Derek K. Bowett, 
Reprisals Involving Recourse 10 Anned Forre, 66 Am.J.Int'l L. 1-3, 10-11, (1972); Richard A. Falk, The &iml 
Raid and the InternalionalLAw ~Relalialion, 63 Am.J. Int'l L. 415, 437-442 (1969); former Secretary of Defense, 
Caspar Weinberger, Speech to National Press Club, November 28, 1984 (aimed at securing domestic support). 
If all uses offorce under all circumstances are illegal, then a response by way of selfhelp or self defense partakes 
of the same elements as a reprisal. 
27. Friction, according to Clausewitz, is the element that is unclear and unpredictable in war. Hence, 
This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere 
in contact \vith chance, and brings about effects that cannot he measured, just because they are largely 
due to chance. One, for example, is the weather. Fog can prevent the enemy from being seen in time, 
a gun from firing when it should, a report from reaching the commanding officer. Rain can prevent 
a battalion from arriving, make another late by keeping it not three but eight hours on the march, ruin 
a cavalry charge by bogging the horses down in mud, etc. 
On War 119 (peter Paret & Michael Howard ed., 1972). "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest 
thing is difficult." 
28. The Geneva Protocols of 19n, to wit Protocol I, provide a number of restraints on attacks against 
the economy, but they are in the context of military attacks. Nonetheless, this would reduce the "economic 
warf3re" that arises from a military attack on the economy as a whole. See Articles 51 and 52 mandating 
protection of the civilians and civilian objects, and Article 57 relating to precautionary measures with a view 
to protecting civilians in launching an attack. Geneva Prolocols, Berne: I.C.R.C. Publication, (1977). The United 
States has not ratified the Protocols. 
29. See McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 8, who have devoted a major book to this subject. Some of 
the featores of this inquiry can be found in traditional sources, such as the chapters of Manual of Public 
International Law, ch.12 (Max Soerensen, ed., 1968). See, e.p. the bibliography, id., at 844-54. The author of 
this chapter, KrzysztofJ. Skubiszewski, who argues that high intensity conflict, turning to weapons of high 
intensity destruction, lead to a change in law. With regard to economic warf3re, he notes: 
Economic warf3re, starvation, blockades, obliteration bombing, including pUtposeful destruction 
of civilian targets such as residential areas hundreds of miles behind the frontlines, indiscriminate 
totpedoing of shipping, or use oflong distance rockets and atomic bombs against enemy territory 
without discriminating between targets, are measures of warfare which have put an end to the 
inviolability of civilians and destroyed the basic distinction of the law of war, namely, the difference 
between armed forces and civilian population, and between military and non-military objectives. !d. 
at 803. 
The existing law remains "in force" but loses its effectiveness: it is simply disregarded. 
30. The ebb and flow of belligerent practice accounts for differing perspectives about the effectiveness 
of the law of war and ?IS to future expectations about moderating its destructive force. Hersch Lautetpacht 
immediately after the second World War pointed out the limits in seeking to strengthen that law through 
treaties and international agreements. See, e.g., Hersch Lautetpacht, The Problem of Ille Revision of I/le LAw ~ 
War, 29 Brit. Y.B.Int'l L.36O (1952); Hersch Lautetpacht, The limits ~Ihe Operalion ~Ihe LAw ~War, 30 
Brit. Y.B. Int'l 1. 206 (1953). 
31. See Soerensen, supra note 29, at 831, 839. Angary is a right to destroy or use neutral vessels in 
case of necessity, and according to some, such vessels may be captured in home waters, on the high seas, or 
in enemy territory. The right is subject to compensation. Economic warfare at sea is a special instance of 
economic warfare, fashioned by the conditions imposed by the use of the high seas, and the need to have 
appropriate naval forces for its effectiveness. 
32. See discussion in Soerensen, supra note 29, at 753 el seq. This discussion, however, tends to ignore 
the distinction of reprisal from retorsion. The conceptual difficulty with reprisals is making the instrument 
operate as an instrument to promote public order, and to refrain from their operation as action-reaction 
measures untouched by the fundamental policy considerations and obligations of the parties. Reprisals and 
neutrality commenced in early belligerent practice but have been altered with modern practices of war. See 
George Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers ofInternational Law, 104, 114 (1962). 
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33. McDoug:al and Feliciano, supra note 8 at 384. The discussion that follows in this portion of the paper 
draws upon the analysis of these two authors in ch. 5 of this book. 
34. Cikd in id., at 388. 
35. As we pursue the quest into minimum order, it is evident that the questions also include the 
responsibilities of the states participating, the burdens allocated amongst them, their tolerances as to the 
permissibility of coercion, the impact of such developments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact (pact of Paris, 1928), and the United Nations. Such questions raising perspectives among 
states have their bearing on the changing attitudes toward contraband, and toward opening blockade to 
long-distance blockades, changing the premises of the Declaration of London, 1909 that were conditioned on 
actual blockades. See McDoug:al and Feliciano, supra note 8, at ch. 5. 
36. Robert H.Jackson, address to Inter-American Bar Association, Havana, March 27,1941,35 Am.J. 
Int'l L. 348, 349 (1941). He also pointed out: 
I want the leg:al profession of this hemisphere to know that [U.S. decisions of policy] are being 
made in the conviction that the structure ofinternationallaw, however apparently shaken, is one of 
the most valuable assets of our civilization. There may be differences of opinion as to some of its 
particular rules, but we have made conscientious effort to square our national policy with enlightened 
concepts of the law of nations viewed in its entirety. [d., at 349. 
CJ. Ian Brownlie, International Law and The Use of Force by States, 402-404 (1963), and cikd in MaIjorie 
M. Whiteman, 11 Digest ofInternational Law 143 (1968). 
The classical and positivist conception of neutrality which developed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was one of complete impartiality towards the parties to any conflict unless a treaty 
of alliance modified the position. The foundation of the doctrine of absolute neutrality was the absolute 
right of the state to resort to war. With the appearance of categories of unlawful war in the League 
Covenant the doctrine of absolute sovereignty was modified although this modification took place in 
the special context of a collective security system. 
Stegenerally, Whiteman at 139-143 et seq. 
37. Id., at 349,350. 
38. Ste supra note 20, at 7-6, which states that with the United Nations, states may be subject to acting 
in accordance with Security Council directives. However, it points out that states must refrain from aiding 
states that are the object of such directives citing Article 43 of the Charter. A reading of this Article shows that 
while this and other provisions establish affirmative responsibilities they do not establish the negative 
responsibilities to refrain: these would have to be implied. 
39. Jackson insisted on his primary claim that the United States was deliberately bending the rules of 
neutrality because this was justified under the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and because the doctrine of the just war 
supported his position. Moreover, he insisted that state practice showed that other states had done the same. 
He even added that the claim to support the United Kingdom on a discriminatory basis could be based upon 
self defense supra note 36, at 357. Moreover, 
No longer can it be argued that the civilized world must behave with rigid impartiality toward 
both an aggressor in violation of the treaty and the victims of unprovoked artack ••• A system of 
international law which can impose no penalty on a law-breaker and also forbids other states to aid 
the victim would be self-defeating and would not help even a little to realize mankind's hope for 
enduring peace. Id., at 358. 
Jackson quoted from Elihu Root, a leading public official and lawyer, to the effect that "an international breach 
of the peace is a matter which concerns every member of the Community of Nations - a matter in which 
every nation has a direct interest, and to which every nation has a right to object." [d., at 353. 
40. Where it is argued that sovereign states are free to claim no control except their own will, they have 
no "Ieg:al duty to any other nation." Hence, "since there is no law binding it to keep the peace, all wars are 
leg:al and all wars must be regarded as just." Id., at 350. Hobbes expressed the context: 
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The 
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common 
power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. 
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Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, 162 (E.A.Burtt, ed., 1939). Hobbes 
elaborates on the just war thesis at length in subsequent pages. For major commentaries on the '~ust war," s« 
James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, (1981); Paul Ramsey, The Just War: 
Force and Political Responsibility (1968); William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (1981). 
An attempt of a distinguished philosopher - Immanuel Kant - to lay down a framework of peace but entailing 
controls over the resort to force emerged from the earlier works of Abbe de Saint-Pierre, who had the practical 
experience as an envoy to the Peace Congress at Utrecht in 1712, and from the proposals of Leibniz and 
Rousseau. Kant's work on "everlasting peace" had six articles calling for peace settlements without secret 
reservations for a future war, a ban on acquisition of independent existing states, the absolute abolishing of 
standing annies, a ban on national debt "contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state," a ban 
on interfering "in the constitution and government of another state," and an undertaking that belligerents shall 
not engage in hostilities "that would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace." 
Summarized in H. Trivers, The Communily '!fMan, 34-35, (1977). 
The arguments between former Secretaries of Defense and State, Weinberger and Shultz, discussed later 
on the use offorce, appear in a policy vacuum: there are no official United States positions that have adopted 
either view or a combination of the two. One commentator argued that the "debate" was dangerous because 
it did not state clearly what the United States would do in resorting to force. Others argued that the two 
positions helped to claritY and lock in the United States policy process. For the arguments and discussions su, 
generally, Ethics and American Power, (Ernest W. Lefever, ed., 1984). 
41. Jackson would find some support in the resolution of the Institute ofInternational Law, 1963, cited 
in Soerensen, supra note 29, at 811: 
••• that there cannot be complete equality in the application of the rules of the law of war when 
the competent organ of the United Nations has detennined that one of the belligerents has resorted 
to armed force in violation of the rules of the law of nations consecrated by the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
But this is a reflection of action taken by the United Nations, i.e., the Security Council, or the pennissive 
actions recommended by the General Assembly. Nevertheless, it is of interest in a United Nations that is 
gradually assuming authority as states express and reveal their will to operate under directives of the Security 
Council as in the Iraqi situation. 
42. !d., at 358. Jackson quoted from Grotius, "it is the duty of neutrals to do nothing which may 
strengthen the side which has the worse cause, or which may impede the motions of him who is carrying on 
ajustwar." !d., at351. HenceJackson coupled the notion of the '~ust" war with the legal equality ofbelligerents 
under the law of war, indicating that the aggressor may have to shed some of this equality. This of course is 
an extreme position not widely adopted. 
43. See generally, Daniel P. O'Connell, 2 International Law of the Sea 1094-1158 (Ivan Shearer, ed., 
1988). 
44. Seegenerally, Julius Stone, Legal Controls ofInternational conflict, (1973); Dietrich Schindler&Jiri 
Toman, ed, Laws of Armed Conflict (1988) provide the best source of the treaty laws and the source references; 
Edward N. Luttwak, Political Uses of Sea Power, (1974) is a valuable study of the resort to naval forces in 
"peacetime;" and Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy, (1988) considers Soviet views as 
expressed by various Soviet spokesmen. See also, Daniel P. O'Connell, Influence of Law Upon Sea Power, 
(1975); Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea (1983); the series published by the Naval War College at 
Newport, Rhode Island, called International Law Studies, are important source materials. The "science" of 
law is a science of accommodation among claims and claimants, with stress on methodology that must be 
flexible and able to adapt to changing events and perspectives. Thus, it varies from the hard sciences dependent 
on mathematical formulae and exactness. Cj. Mark Kac & Stanislaw M. UJam, Mathematics and Logic (1968). 
45. 1 U.S. Foreign Relations 36 (1928); quoted in Law of Nations 977-978 (Herbert W. Briggs, ed., 2d 
ed.,1952). 
46. See, generally, Whiteman, supra note 36, v. 11, at 451 el seq. Cj. the Declaration of Panama, 1939, 
quoted al451, in which the Latin American republics insisted on their "inherent right" to protect and defend 
themselves collectively. Other examples are given. The concept of self defense in World War II gradually 
expanded to counter the threat, so that the United States claimed neutrality even though providing military 
force to ensure the supply of goods to Britain. 
47. Cited in id.,supra note 36, at 159. 
48. Charles C. Hyde, 3 International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 2315 
(2d rev. ed., 1945), cited in Whiteman, at 474. Guggenheim is cited for the proposition that a belligerent 
subjected to neutral behavior favoring its enemy with military assistance as being the subject to aggression. ld. 
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It is evident dut the Hague conventions and other instruments relating to neutrality are at risk with these 
changing expectations: many of them are gradually slipping into desuetude. 
49. Seapower and Strategy (Colin S. Gray & Roger W. Barnett, ed., 1989). 
50. A naval report of1963 declared: 
The primary role of seapower in our national militaty strategy is to contribute to our national 
readiness to project U.S. power overseas. Sea areas lie berween us and any prospective allies. Extensive 
use of the seas is necessaty for support of our allies and for the support of our own militaty forces on 
their soil •••• These f2ctors dictate an offensive naval strategy. Our Navy must be designed ro carry 
the war to the enemy, both at sea and on land. In our early history the navy was frequendy forced 
into a coastal defense strategy. It was only afrer we shook off the shackles of these defensive concepts 
that we were able to exploit our full potential and perform our primary mission-control of vital sea 
areas. Cited in id., at 333. 
According to an NSC Report of January 1977: 
Sea control is the fundamental function of the navy; it connotes control of designated air, surface, and 
subsurface areas. It does not require simultaneous control over all waters but is exercised where and when 
needed. ld., at 336 
51. Admiral Louis Denfeld's Report of1951, quoted in Gray & Barnett, id., at 329. 
52. !d., at 345. Sea control, of course, is critical to the assurance of an economic warfare strategy. The 
expansion of such a strategy and of such control into policing and enforcing security against the international 
traffic in drugs is a current example of this strategy turned toward the economies so to speak of criminal 
commerce and trade. 
53. Quoted in Soviet Military Power, 1990,22-23 (1990). It is noted: 
This recognition not only heightens the importance of political as distinct from militaty-technical 
variables in the security calculus, but places unusual emphasis on threat reduction, unilateral restraint, 
and collaboration with adversaries. 
Past practice with the Soviet Union, however, suggests dut such positions can be genuine, or they can be 
positions based on the elements of deception. 
54. Admiral James D. Watkins, ~ Maritime Strategy, U.S. Nav. Proc. 4 qanuary, 1986). The view taken 
in the present paper is in the context of a larger, "grand" strategy dut includes peacetime strategies, and 
continuous attention to building, curing peacetime, the economic and related bases of power. 
55. CJ. Manfred Eigen & Ruthi1d Winkler, Law of the Game (How the Principles of Nature Govern 
Chance) (1981). Though somewhat esoteric, the following observation is relevant: 
Everything that happens in our world resembles a vast game in which nothing is determined in 
advance but the rules, and only the rules are open to objective understanding. The game itself is not 
identical with either its rules or with the sequence of chance happenings that determine the course of 
play. It is neither the one nor the other because it is both at once. 
If arms control is a "game," then the rules [equilibrium, balancing, deterrence] may be objectively assessed, 
but arms control in the policy sense then becomes a matter dut involves both the rules and the substance. 
Transformed to naval capabilities, we discover dut the fundamental rule - equality ofinterests among the rivals 
dut conclude the agreements - is not applicable. 
56. Recent practice includes the Malvinas/Falklands War berween the United Kingdom and Argentina. 
For a brief review of the maritime exclusion zones, see Robin R. Churchill & Alan V. Lowe, Law of the Sea 
308 (1988). 
57. The early law relating to neutrality was based, according to Schwarzenberger, on a single premise: 
It was dut, unless the contrary was established by treaty, all foreign princes and their subjects might 
be treated as enemies. Whether met on land or sea, they were f2ir prey. If a foreign prince or his subject 
were to expect any different treatment, they had to show dut they were in a state of amity with the 
other Power concerned or at least protected by a treaty of truce or special safe-conducts. 
George 5chwarunberger, The Frontiers oflntemational Law, 12 (1962). The first English Proclamation of 
Neutrality was issued in 1536 by Henry VIII to reach those who sought to achieve as neutral goods the goods 
ofa state in belligerency with England. [Id., at 13]. For further studies see E. Turlington, 3 Neutrality, World 
War Period, (1976); S.W.D. Rowson, Prize lAw During the Second World War, 1947 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. A view 
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of a French authority of blockade during the first World Waris that of Louis Guichard, The Naval Blockade 
1914-18 (1930). 
58. See for a general assessment George S. Schwarzenberger, International Conflict 19 at cbs. 52, 53, et 
seq. Cj., also Green H. Hackworth, Digest ofInternational Law, § 627, at 134 et seq. on reprisals and the change 
in the tolerances as to the exercise of reprisals during the first World War. For a general survey, see Lassa 
Oppenheimer, International Law (Hersh Lauterpacht, ed., 7th ed., Part III 1952). 
59. See James W. Gamer, Prize Law Duling the World War (1927). Gamer reviewed the jurisprudence 
of Lord Stowell in connection with his unwillingness to change and reshape prize law. See pp. xliv el seq. The 
prize courts depended primarily upon their municipal directives, i.e., through statues or legislation, to make 
their determinations. Gamer assesses this practice in ch. 1. 
60. Cited by Schwarzenberger, supra note 57, at 650. 
61. See, generally, Herbert A. Smith, Law and Custom of the Sea (1959), reviewing the British position 
in the first World War, the Orders-in-Counci1, rejecting the Declaration of London. Smith cites the orders 
involved. It is evident that the British had turned to long-distance blockades, which they believed critical to 
their defense, and thus had broken through the restraints of the Declaration that limited blockades to close-in 
actions. 
62. !d., at 246. 
63. Cj. Schwarzenberger, supra note 57, at 650-651. See also Hackworth, supra note 58, at 142 et seq. 
Belligerent states are shown to stumble intentionally over the language of their treaties like the Declaration of 
London, and over the semantics of language. The matter of blockade is covered by the citation from 
Hackworth. 
64. States adopt among other goals the sanctioning goals of prevention and deterrence. In terms of a 
peacetime strategy [employing either or both persuasive or coercive measures], Western states alert to the 
ultimate need for global order must take steps to ensure that the Soviet Union does not become again the 
awesome threat that it was when its economic base of power was sufficient to amass its present arsenal. For 
an analysis of the strategies in the coercive context of military force, but with clear analogies to an analysis of 
strategies other than military strategies, see McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 5, at 287-96. The strategic goal 
in the global arena according to these two distinguished commentators is to establish global public order 
affording security, preservation of fundamental values, and order among states as a whole, not maintaining 
public order precariously through competing and contending states. 
65. A full discussion of the use of Western funding and SUbterfuge in doing so for Soviet exclusive and 
power goals is set forth inJudy Shelton, The Coming Soviet Crash, (1989). Shelton shows the linking up of 
trade and trading links and dependencies, offunding to the Soviet Union, enabling it to maintain, as it currently 
does, a major military and military related effort, as well as extravagances such as major activities in outer space, 
and major funding of naval forces, and of commercial ventures. The Western states cannot impose effective 
restraints upon Soviet uses offunds, nor prevent it from acquiring and augmenting its technologies for strategic 
and military purposes. This could however be reversed by the adoption of appropriate strategies that should 
couple such support with clear showing of Soviet progress in democratic efforts, or toward democratic values. 
66. By way of comment here: the disturbing element of fhlse allegations is almost treated as permissible 
act of deception by belligerents injustifYing their own actions. False allegations were made in the Korean War 
of1950 by the North Koreans and Chinese that the United States had resorted to bacteriological warfare, and 
"confessions" extracted from prisoners of war, but these ceased when the United States demanded an 
investigation by the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
67. George S. Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied to Armed Conflict 647 (1976). Footnotes 
and citations omitted. Reprisals and counter-reprisals soon dissociated from the legal framework made up 
much of World War II practice. Adoption of war zones, extensive mine-fields, and sink at sight practices 
further reduced the certainty of neutrality and its controlling law. As Schwarzenberger points out: 
••• all that has happened is that, in two major wars, both sides have done their best to interpret to 
their liking unsertled and controversial points ofJaw and found it convenient to justifY their own action 
by alleging breaches by the enemy of the same law, now more strictly interpreted. Id., at 651. 
Total war, he believes, as did Lauterpact, would lead to the end of the law of neutrality, and, in effect, of 
international law itself. 
68. William N. Medlicott,1 The Economic Blockade, (1952). The basic principles recognized by the 
British prize courts follow the rules of the Declaration ofParls, 1856, and Article 2, Declaration of London, 
1909, to wit: blockade to be binding must be militarily effective; only a belligerent can establish a blockade; 
duly declared and notified as to exact geographical limits and days of grace for neutral ships to leave the area; 
and, limited to ports and coasts of the enemy. Id., at 4. These rules like the others relating to economic warfare 
were to be stretched during the war. 
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69. ld., at 2. All measures of belligerency are treated under law as matters awaiting the practice of 
belligerent and neutral states because that practice determines the tolerances among states as to belligerent 
conduct. The process necessarily calls for flexibility and adaptation, and fora conception oflaw that is emerging 
and readily subject to the impacts of new methods of warfare. 
70. !d. at 17. Three categories of economic warfare weapons were mentioned: legislative action reaching 
financial and commercial activities; diplomatic action to reach the neutrals; and military action in the broadest 
sense. The measures would include (1) interruption of supplies from overseas as contraband; (2) withholding 
supplies under the control of the U.K.; (3) offers to purchase guaranteed quantities of goods to remove them 
from the market; and (4) shipping control, and statutory listing, such as the navicert, etc. ld., at 17-22. 
71. 2 id., at 11. 
72. &e generally, Schwarzenberger, supra note 58, at 644 et seq. Angary is supported by the legal authority 
of a belligerent to requisition [but pay for) a neutral ship. The requisition of a neutral ship is a form of economic 
coercion against neutrals. Angary under international practice requires that the taking be limited to the ship 
and not include the cargo, be taken upon a showing of military necessity or public need, and be covered by 
full compensation for use or destruction of the ship. ld., at 636. Related legal institutions that might be 
considered include maritime seizure of all ships providing assistance to the enemy, embargo or prohibition on 
shipping, requisition under municipal law, thereby avoiding the restraints of international law relating to angary, 
eminent domain, arrest of princes [i.e., and effective in peacetime as well as wartime), and expropriation, 
illustrated in distinction to angary by the United States requisition of contracts for uncompleted ships in her 
shipyards in World War I NOrMgian Shipping Claims Case, 1922. ld., at 640-641. 
73. 2 Medlicott, supra note 68, at 15. 
74. For further analysis see Stone, Schwarzenberger, Colombos and Tucker, op.dt. It is evident however 
that the Security Council's resolutions are drafted by the permanent and other members of the United Nations, 
so that the language can be ambiguous, or be drafted to enable them to avoid actions they do not want to 
take. Article 50 the United Nations Charter affords states the right of consultation with the Security Council 
when a member facing preventive or enforcement measures "finds itself confronted with special economic 
problems arising from the carrying out of those measures." 
75. Cited in Whiteman, supra note 36, at 451. 
76. The applicable law is sometimes divided into the law of war that includes both customary international 
law, treaty law, and the principles such as the principle of military necessity. The application of the principle 
of military necessity has not yet been given the refining assessments that are made with the use of force. 
Belligerents are to refrain from causing unnecessary suffering, nsing disproportionate force, or striking 
non-military targets. However, if economic warfare includes forcible actions against cities or other strategic 
targets involving the economy, or is applied through forcible measures, then these principles and standards are 
readily applied. &e generaIIy, Law of Naval Warfare, in Appendix, at 357 et seq., of Robert W. Tucker, The 
Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, International Law Studies (1955). 
n. Article 0605, Observance ofinternational Law, in U.S. Navy Regulations 1973, declares: 
At all times a commander shall observe, and require his command to observe, the principles of 
international law. Where necessary to fulfillment of this responsibility a departure from other provisions 
of Navy Regulations is authorized. quoted in (NWP 9) (REV.A)FMFM 1-10, see supra note 20, at 4. 
78. Rules of engagement in the United States practice include in those rules directives that are guided 
by international law. Many remain classified. If they, and the rules of other states can be declassified and 
harmonized as to policy or content, they would afford an additional and important source ofinternationallaw, 
feeding practice and action into the legal regime. 
79. Cf. Stone, supra note 44, at 411 et seq. 
80. ld., at 413 et seq. 
81. Neill H. Alford, Modem Economic Warfare, International Law Studies, 1963, (1967). Alford is the 
source of much of the discussion that follows. 
82. ld., at 1. 
83. Stone, supra note 44, at 600 
84. Stone, supra note 44, at 607, n.27 
85. Cited by Alford, supra note 81, at 19. 
86. The importance of strategy to the emerging law is readily perceived in the writings of the strategists 
themselves. &e, e.g., Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (1982); James Cable, 'I7te 
Diffusion oj Maritime Power, International Relations, Nov. 1982 (considering the appearance of new naval 
vessels); Michael E. Howard, T7te Classical Strategists, from Studies in War and Peace (1970) (reviewing the 
appearance of the nuclear weapon, and its use, even for deterrence, to be that of the threat against cities); 
Aaron L. Friedberg, A History oJthe U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine' - 1945 to 1980," Journal of Strategic Studies, 37 
(Dec. 1980) (with the interesting observation that strategies depend upon an intended use of weapons, so that 
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a no-first-use or non-use strategy with nuclear weapons would be meaningless); Fritz Ennarth, Conlrasl5 in 
American and Soviet Strategic Though, Soviet Military Thinking (Derek Leebaert, ed., 1981). 
87. Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, (1890). Mahan's remarks about the 
study of history to ascertain strategy and the development of naval tactics points out that "theories about the 
naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive." The theories offered have not been tested. The 
practice of states instead suggests the continuing modification of naval vessels, and with the new weaponry, 
the modification of naval tactics from close-in fighting to fighting that may be distant and between fleets that 
never see each other. Cj. R2m P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (1983). Anand traces 
the economic and military strategies and coercion in the Indian Ocean, and in the Far East in general. The 
rulers subjected to European aggression had practiced freedom of the seas in the Indian Ocean and adjacent 
seas. ld., at 21. Mahan further observes that the freedom of travel or navigation across the seas has been 
established over long practice, and this states seek to protect or if need be defend: 
The first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point 
of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all 
directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose 
certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; .•• !d., at 25. 
Hence the wealth of sea-faring nations is to be found in the strengthening of their sea power, and to protect 
that wealth and access to it, they create their naval forces: 
In these three things-production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby 
the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and 
tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety-is to be found the key to much of the history, as 
well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea. !d., at 28; see also at 53. 
The general theme is picked up by British commentators. See, e.g., Herbert W. Richmond, National 
Policy and Naval Strength (1928);)ulian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (1911). 
88. Much of this development can be traced in C.)ohn Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, 
(6th ed., (1957). § 720. 
89. ld., at 2 
90. ld., at4 
91. Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State 1-2 (1979). Imperialism, Gorshkov insists, compels a 
major naval force, essential to the security of the Soviet Union, and essential for ensuring "its interests" at sea. 
The imperialists he believes use sea power for aggression aimed at third countries, and aimed at holding their 
military blocs in check, as well as an instrument to threaten communism. 
92. ld., at 280. The change in naval force has led to a change in strategy - and this under one of the 
themes in my paper has led to a dynamic situation for the emerging law: 
The revolution in military affairs has led to substantial shifts in all fields of military theory and 
practice. It has also brought changes in the organization of the navy, invaded the field of naval theory 
and touched on the content of naval art from tactics to the strategic use of a navy. This has brought 
in its train the elaboration of modem naval art, characterized by new categories and a kind of distillation 
offormer concepts and principles. ld., at 281-282. 
93. ld., at ix. Gorshkov's perspective is primarily in terms of the American threat, and countering that 
threat, militarily and politically. This would be deceptive if the view were taken that with the diminishment of 
the Soviet threat the United States faced neither threats, objectives, nor missions for a large, and varied, navy. 
94. See McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 8, at 477 et seq. The techniques extend from more narrowly 
constricted war zones, declared and defined in extent by the belligerents, but dependent upon their ability to 
enforce those zones, to a series of "comprehensive administrative techniques of economic warfare." 
95. ld., at 488 et seq. 
96. !d., at 480. 
97. See id., at 484, n. 242. 
98. See Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am.). Int'l L. 597 (1963). 
99. See discussion in McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 8, at 494 et seq. 
100. For several views on this problem see the selections in Lillich & Moore, 62 International Law Studies 
(1980), e.g., S. Rosenne, IntemarionalLAw and the Use of Force," 1.,laying down a framework of standards for 
considering the use offorce,). McHugh, Forcible Self-Help in Inten/ationalLAw, 139, providing some of the 
traditional views, W. O. Miller, Belligerency and limited War 164, and). McNulty, Blockade: Evollllion and 
Expectation at 172. 
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lOt. Miller, supra note 100, at 168. 
102. Ultimately, the entire law of commerce control becomes one in which the enemy subjected to a 
superior rival in terms of command of the seas would be unable to trade. 1bis came through military capabilities that 
could impose controls on export and import of goods, thus combining practices involving the administrative 
controls over contraband, and blockade, reaching goods whether of enemy destination or enemy sources. &e 
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 8, at 508-509. The authors further review the use of navicert, which, once 
issued, enabled the neutral to avoid seizure and condemnation, and "rationing" which determined the quotas 
of the neutral, its needs in material resources, and the undertaking to keep to those quotas, or be subject to 
the excess being condemned or destroyed. The prize courts applied these administrative measures, giving them 
the force of municipal law, in an international context. In addition to these, World War II brought "black 
listing," to identifY neutrals engaged in conduct inconsistent with the above measures; economic measures 
thatled to high prices, cutting off sources of supply, sabotage, robbery, and preclusive buying. ld., at 518-519. 
103. Quoted, Marian C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916, 10 (1957). Hankey is thus 
a voice among those who would support regulation of economic warfare largely by customary international 
law rather than by the more rigid legislative approach of such treaties as the Declaration of London. The 
Declaration of London though never ratified nor in force contains much that is ascribed to customary 
international law relating to neutrality, blockade, and economic wamre. For discussions, see The Law of Naval 
Warfare 269 [Essay by Kalshoven], (Natalino Ronzitti, ed., 1988); A. Cohen, Declaration of London (1911); 
James B. Scotr, Declaration ~ London, including documents and negotiating record, (1919); the text in 
International Law Topics, (1910); and the related materials in Harold H. Marrin &Joseph R. Baker, Laws of 
Maritime Warfare,(1918) and in Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power, (1924). 
104. The United States Department of Defense in Soviet Military Power 1990, 88 (1990), states: 
The Soviet Navy's vital strategic forces, defensively oriented missions and strategy, and exclusion 
from current CFE [Conventional Force Europe] negotiations, might place it in a better position than 
the other branches of the Soviet armed forces to weather Gorbachev's program of defense drawdowns. 
Despite some reductions in operating tempo, out-of-area deployments, and changes in force structure, 
Soviet naval missions remain virtually unchanged. Current modernization programs, if successful, could 
make the Soviet Navy a smaller yet qualitatively more capable force while projecting a less threatening 
image abroad. 
The same publication indicates a decline in Soviet naval launchings, but the appearance of higher degree of 
sophistication and technological standards. ld., at 36. 
105. &e Harriet F. & William F. Scotr, Soviet Military Doctrine, (1988), for an assessment and analysis 
of existing Soviet military thinking, and the interaction of such thinking with communist doctrine. Even if 
the communist doctrine is eliminated, the military principles relating to correlation of forces, superiority of 
weaponry, anticipatory or pre-emptive strikes, and so on are likely to remain unaffected should the military 
forces be called upon to act: much of the discipline, training and theoretical science is too deeply instill~d to 
ell.l'ect change in the next decades. &e id., at 130 et seq. The Scotts trace the evolution of Soviet strategi~ and 
military thinking, much of which includes the assumption that the Soviet economic base will be sufficient to 
sustain a major military effort. The laws of war though evolving and being altered to meet changing realIties 
are intended to clarifY and lead to economies in decisions, formulating combat operations, and in achieving 
victory; they are said to "determine the choice ofform and methods of; military action." [d., at 158. According 
to the Scotts, the Soviet elites have not changed their political goals or military terms of reference: 
They stress that the total correlation offorces - economic, scientific-technical, moral-political, and 
military - must be kept in their favor. Stability in international affairs is not a desired goal. •.• It would 
be prudent for Western planners to consider that the real reason for [Gorbachev's] "restructuring" is 
to ensure that the laws of war are kept in the Kremlin's favor. [d., at 159. 
106. According to the inquiry made by Reynolds, thalassocracies means "maritime supremacy." This 
according to early historians is "the control of the sea lanes and islands by one state to insure its economic 
prosperity and thus its political integrity." Only six appear in history: the Minoans, ancient Athens, Venice 
and Aorence in the Renaissance, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. Maritime states are 
characterized by free enterprise, market economies, individual initiative, technological change, and so on. 
Clark G. Reynolds, History and The Sea, 20 et seq ch. 2 (1989). Reynolds argues that unlike Marxian views 
where economic motivation is primary, the motivation of the maritime states is more complex promoting the 
shaping and reshaping of business forms and relationships. For a detailed study, see The U.S. Stake in Naval 
Arms Control, (1990). 
107. The Adderbury Conversations, in Appendix I, of Eric Grove, Maritime Strategy and European 
Security, 91 (1990). The conversations and the strategic dialogue of November 17-19, 1989 provide a valuable 
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set of statements concerning the position of both sides. The United States pointed out in the second meetings 
that: 
The Maritime Strategy is not a war plan but a concept of operations for US Naval forces. It reflects 
the best naval experience and the advice of the responsible theatre commanders covering contingencies 
from routine peace to global war. Equally it is not a 'go it alone' US Navy strategy but the maritime 
component of national strategy. It reviewed and restated the explicit thinking of US civil leaders and 
their tasking to the naval forces deployed (a) to defend US and aJIied interests, (b) to control vital sea 
lines of communication with allies and (c) to conduct counter offensive operations, if necessary, in 
both US and aJIied defence •••• [it] emphasized the role of joint and combined forces in the event of 
war. It recognized from the beginning that navies alone cannot win wars but they can lose them. !d., 
at 119. 
108. Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, (25th ed., 1917). Mahan 
further observes that history has a value in the field of naval strategy, because in large measure the principles 
of strategy unlike those of tactics reaches to a broader base. Citing a French authority, Morogues: 
Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes of which, namely the arms, may change; 
which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the manner of handling them, 
and so finally in the disposition and handling of fleets. Quoted, id., at 10. 
Hence, 
The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in confonnity with the 
principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only 
detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying 
them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of 
tactics have not only taken place '!fter changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the 
interval between such changes has not been duly long. ld., at 9. 
109. Dissenting opinion, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
110. Charles M. Sternhell & Alan Thorndike, Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II. Operations 
Evaluation Report #51 xi (1946). 
111. Brian McCue, U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis 176-77 (1990). 
Footnotes omitted in the citation. 
112. For a comprehensive analysis see Clark G. Reynolds, History and the Sea (1989). In the discussion 
in this paper, it should be noted that Soviet military doctrine does not call for its forces to act defensively in 
combat, and in fact the capability of Soviet forces to act either offensively or defensively as needed. &e id., at 
205. 
113. Id., at 85. 
114. Force planning is described in detail in Robert P. Haffa,]r., Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: 
Planning U.S. Forces (1988). Maj. William Huggins in a letter to Defense News, 18 (April 20-26) elucidates 
this interaction: 
Deterrence is based on threats: those received and those sent. It demands a force structure based 
on survivable offensive weapons capable ofinflicting unacceptable destruction. The enemy must know 
we can and will use these weapons. The ability to compel an enemy is based on capability and the sort 
offlexible, durable, lethal forces that can enter a conflict and win. The debate over threat-vs-capability-
based force structures is a debate over deterrence vs. the ability to compel as the basis for a national 
military strategy. 
Huggins thus finds an interaction between deterrence, defense, and effective use of strategy and strategic 
instruments to assert national power. 
115. &e Lester Nurick, TI,e Distinction between Combatant and Noncombatant in the Law '!f War, 39 Am.]. 
Int'l L. 680 (1945). Trends, according to Nurick, are toward breaking down the distinction. Nurick's paper 
indicates that this has occurred through a widening of the "necessity" in warfare, affected in tum by the changes 
in technology. 
116. The elements of control are to be found in various instruments: concepts, terms relating to the 
relations involved, and a theory have been described as essential. For a study, see E.]. Meehan, The Thinking 
Game (1988). The paper stresses that these elements emerge from the actions states are taking, and to define 
them, or even to impose legal standards on those actions i.e., here, the standards of pennissibility calls for 
'J 
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institutions with law-making authority in the legislative rather than the judicial sense. Almond has criticized 
the International Court ofJustice as acting ultra vires in 1M NU4raguan Military Aaivities Case NU4ragua v. United 
States of America, 17 Cal. W. L.J. 146 (Winter 1981). The case is at 1986 I.CJ. 14. 
117. The significant element with respect to deterrence in peacetime is its political character, i.e., it operates 
through the interaction and interdependence of decisions made by the public officials in charge of foreign 
policy. Military capabilities serve, but are subordinate to, political objectives and the operation of deterrence 
is primarily in the hands of civilian public officials. War in this perspective is the breakdown of deterrence. 
The operational element or that upon which the deterrent effort is focused is that ofintentions or expectations 
of those to be deterred, i.e., the objective is to assure that they will not oppose deterrence, or act inconsistent 
with the expectations of deterrence. In some of the broader manifestations or notions about deterrence it may 
be expanded to include compellence, in which others are pressed to act in a certain way and are "compelled" 
by threats or action if they refuse. Examples might be found in the attempts to compel Iraq to fuJfi)) United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
118. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (1954). 
119. On these factors, see grntrally, Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (1981), esp. 
the introductory chapters. Thomas C. Schelling argues that strategy is the outcome of the strategies invoked 
by the rivals, and that their arena is in a sense a "game." Assuming that the game itself remains in force - i.e., 
the checks and balancing of deterrence and the principle of equilibrium - then "the best course of action for 
each player depends on what the other players do. The term is intended to focus on the interdependence of 
the adversaries' decision and on their expectations about each other's behavior." Thomas C. Snelling, The 
Strategy of Conllict 3 (1960). Considered as claims between the rivals, there is a similarity here to the 
fundamental process of claim that is found in the emergence oflaw through the patterns of behavior of those 
participating in interactions about relations or activities among states [or among states and other entities and 
individuals in trade and commerce]. 
120. Deterrence in war differs from deterrence in peacetime: during war, the attempt is to deter atracks 
or the use of particular weapons; during peacetime, it may be limited to the weapons covered by a specific 
"arms control" agreement, but it is generally aimed at the broader deterrence: that is, deterrence against a 
military strike, aggression, or war itself. In his discussion of national maritime strategy, Admiral James D. 
Watkins remarked: 
Our national military strategy is designed: to preserve this country's political identity, framework, 
and institutions; to protect the United States, including its foreign assets and allies; to foster the country's 
economic well-being; and to bolster an international order supportive of the vital interests of this 
country and its allies. To achieve these ends, our national strategy is built on three pillars: deterrence, 
forward defense, and alliance solidarity. James D. Watkins, Maritime Strategy U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc. 4 
ijanuary 1986). 
This is a version of the "grand strategy," encompassing the elements of national power and national purpose. 
121. Thomas C. Schelling illustrates "compellence" and distinguishes it form deterrence in the following 
example: 
Blockade illustrates the typical difference between a threat intended to make an adversary do 
something and a threat intended to keep him from starting something. The distinction is in the timing 
and in the initiative, in who has to make the first move, in whose initiative is put to the test. To deter 
an enemy's advance it may be enough to bum the escape bridges behind me, or to rig a trip-wire 
between us that automatically blows us both up when he advances. To rompel an enemy's retreat, 
though, by some threat of engagement I have to be committed to move • ••• The threat that compels 
rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than 
ifhe acts. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence 69, 70 (1966). 
122. Deterrence through threats of economic sanctions, or economic warfare, is a tenuous notion, and 
in any event, untested. In the traditional perspective, deterrence reduces the likelihood of military moves, and 
is distinguished from defense which reduces an atracker's capabilities to damage his target. Introduced into 
arms control relationships, there is an interaction of threatened coercion and the assumption that the target 
state will refrain from using force. One commentator has indicated: 
Military strategy has always influenced the character of a period, and particularly the nature of its 
international relations ••• Strategy has been transformed into the art of non-war, of the prevention of 
war ••• Prevention of war is achieved by the threat of violence, that is, by the threat of retaliation in 
response to a provocation. Strategy has changed from the art of employing violence into the art of 
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threatening violence, which is the art of deterrence. Yehoshaf2t Harbbi, Nuclear War and Nuclear 
Peace 1 (1966). 
This commentator observes that deterrence has long served the international relations among states, always 
to deter potential aggressors. But deterrence depends upon war making potential, or it is an empty threat. As 
Harbbi point out "war making potential is intended to validate deterrence," and this of course is a potential 
in being, not a potential that might be attained, given enough time. The problem thus leads to a shift in the 
policy making of states from the decisions primarily dependent upon the perspectives of the military 
commander, and his perspectives, to the civilian officials of government, and theirs. But as Clausewitz has 
indicated, the public official must seek out and embrace the advice of his military commanders. Without 
adequate understanding of the needs of deterrence and the urgencies that might be imposed to achieve 
deterrenc;:e capabilities, the public official is poorly served by his advisers, or fills, through his own incompetence 
to understand the import of their advice. &e Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory 
of National Security 3,4 (1961); Thomas C. Schelling and Marton H. Halperin, Arms Control and Strategy, 
20th Century 77 (1961): economic strategies under the GATT and in general in economic relations among 
states can be followed inJ. H.Jackson, Legal Problems ofIntemational Economic Relations, (1977), and Ste 
Abram Chayes, et a1., International Legal Process (1969). 
123. Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, [The Scowcroft Report], 2, 3 (April 
1983). &e also, generally, Discriminate Deterrence, the report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term 
Strategy ijanuary 1988). 
124. States may seek to manipulate the public opinion of each other particularly where that opinion is an 
element of public participation in policy or decisions. As to this democratic states are more vulnerable than 
totalitarian states where public opinion and the means to be informed to participate are closely controlled. For 
a review of the spectrum of state relations extending from periods of high intensity violence or warfare, or 
high intensity coercion, to periods where these are minimal, Ste McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 8, ch. 2, 
at 97 et seq. &e id., at 106: 
The first step [in ascertaining a state of war] we submit toward contact with reality is reference to 
and careful orientation in, the £lctual process of coercion across national boundaries. • • • The 
description we suggest of£lctual coercion in terms of "process" is intended, however, not merely to 
convey a sense of the variety in participant, purpose, modality and claim, but also to stress the facts of 
continuity - continuity in coercive action and reaction and in assertion and counterassertion - and of 
changing intensities in degree, from the mildest to the most severe applications of coercion. Between the 
two extremes of "pure" peace and "total" war, the states the world arena may in these terms be observed 
continuously to engage each other for power and other values, by all instruments of policy in a continuum 
of degrees in coercive practices, ranging from the least intense to the most intense. [stress by authors; 
n. omitted]. 
125. &e, generally, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Michael Howard & Peter Paret, eds., 1976). 
126. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy, 4 (1973). 
127. Strategy, as traditionally conceived, is linked with the traditional methods and weapons of warfare. 
Even the conception of war remains a matter of great ambiguity, if. McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 8; 
see also Julian Lider, Problems of the Classification of Wars (1960); W. V. O'Brien argues that "recoune to 
armed coercion is a perennial feature of the human condition," and implies that with changes in human 
attitudes we will see changes in warfare, and the law that regulates it, William Vincent O'Brien, The Conduct 
of Just and Limited War 2 (1981). The O'Brien text is aimed at the attempts made to regulate through the 
just-war tradition. 
128. Power, and effective exploitation of the power process, is not the only value that is sought by states, 
but it is the value upon which all others depend in periods of competition with others over power itself, or 
over resources and wealth that may be dependent upon the presence or exercise of power. &e,generally, Harold 
D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (1950), and general discussion at xiv-xix, and 74-102. 
The broad perspectives of these authors identifY power as "participation in making of decisions," and therefore 
establish a comprehensive framework for appraisal of who has power to do what, against whom, and for what 
objectives. The quest for power establishes both a nation's strategy and the fashioning of strategic instruments 
intended economically to attain and preserve power. 
129. William V. O'Brien cites one formulation of the principle of economy offorce as that used by the 
United States Army in 1964, i.e., 
Economy of force is the measured allocation of combat power to the primaty task as well as 
secondary tasks. It connotes the application of force necessary to accomplish the mission and not the 
application of as little force as possible. To concentrate superior force in the main effort, minimum 
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necessary force may be used elsewhere. This requires a careful evaluation, particularly where secondary 
efforts contribute heavily to the main effort. O'Brien, supra note 127, at 418. 
Economy offorce and its relation to the principle of military necessity are discussed by McDougal and Feliciano, 
supra note 8, at 35-36. The pressure on military commanders to achieve economies of their scarce military 
resources draws them tighdy into line to achieve both an economy offorce and to reflect the application of 
military necessi~ 
130. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy 6 (1918). Speaking broadly of principles, Mahan noted their role 
in naval strategy as broad guidelines but largely immutable: 
••• for in war the common sense of some, and the genius of others, sees and properly applies means 
to ends; and naval strategy like naval tactics, when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to 
attain ends. But in peace, as in idleness, such matters dropout of mind, unless systematic provision is 
made for keeping them in view. ld., at 5-6. 
Mahan earlier observed that new weapons and new technologies had no effect on principles and found instead 
a confirmation of the Swiss strategist,Jomini, and his "dictum" that "changes in weapons affect practice, but 
not principles." ld., at 4. 
131. ld., at 2. 
132. !d., at 344. This observation apart from the application to this paper bears upon those who are 
proposing various measures for naval arms control, and the elimination of naval facilities abroad. Such controls 
would destabilize a global power situation replacing the deterrence inherent in the navy with the uncertainties 
of future action. They would divorce the ability of the United States to protect interests that demand the 
protection of the navy, and the assertion of interests that also demand its projection or presence. 
Mahan also considers the navy in terms of offensive and defensive use, suggesting a distinction, but a 
distinction arising from how the forces are used, not on the basis of the weapons they carry: 
When war exists between two nations separated by the sea, it is evident that the one which invades 
territory occupied by the other takes the offensive and that the instrument of offense is the arm which 
carries on the invasion, that is, the army. The navy preserves, and assures, the communications of the 
army. That the navy alone makes invasion possible, does not make it the invading force. That it alone 
make the offensive possible, does not make it the offensive arm. That its own mode of action is offensive 
does not necessarily constitute it the offensive factor in a combined operation. In the joint action it 
takes the defensive. That, in pursuit of this defensive role, it takes continual offensive action whenever 
opportunity offers to destroy an enemy's ships, does not alter the essential character ofits operations. 
It defends by offensive action, wherever its guns reach; but if defends. ld., at 432-433. 
133. ld., at 447. He then immediately added, referring first to the necessities of military interest supported 
by "a widespread, deeply rooted, civil interest:" 
To prepare forwarin time of peace is impracticable to commercial representative nations, because 
the people in general will not give sufficient heed to military necessities, or to international problems, 
to feel the pressure which induces readiness. All that naval officers can do is to realize to themselves 
vividly, make it a part of their thought, that a merchant shipping is only one form of many which the 
external relations of a country can assume. 
134. From Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 73 - para. 3 (Samuel B. Griffith, trans., 1963). 
135. Clausewitz supra note 125, at 97. A commentator adding a gloss to Sun Tzu also-refers to the costs 
in scarce resources quickly consumed by war: "Now when the-army marches abroad, the treasury will be 
emptied at home." And Sun Tzu: "when the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state 
will not suffice ••• For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefitted." ld., at 
72, 73. And "those unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are equally unable to 
understand the advantageous ways of doing so." For an analysis of the differing perspectives of strategy see Col. 
Richard M. Swain, 7k Hed~hog and lhe Fox:Jomini, Clausewilz, and His/ory, Nav. War ColI. Rev. 98-109 
(Autumn 1990). 
136. Clausewitz observed that war-making might be either by military forces or by negotiation, stressing 
that the first affords the means to dictate the terms of termination to the conquered enemy, while the second 
enables military [and political] compromise, and even anticipates it: 
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War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to ovetthrow the enemy, to 
render him politically helpless or milibrily impotent or [by appropriate military tactics] for bargaining 
at the peace negotiations ••• But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made 
absolutely clear, namely that war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. !d., at 
69. 
137. In an extensive analysis of the community sanctioning process, McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 
8, at ch. 4, point out: 
Economic strategy seeks to affect all phases - production, conservation, distribution, consumption 
- of wealth processes. It is concerned with methods of and facilities for managing a flow of capital, 
goods, and services across national boundaries. !d., at 322. 
The sanctioning goals are described as "prevention" [i.e., of conditions hannful to minimum order], 
"restoration" [of the targeted violator state to become an acceptable member of the global onler, and terminate 
its unlawful coercion], and "rehabilitation" and "reconstruction" [aimed at providing relief for the damage 
caused by the sanctions]. !d., at 322-329. In a earlier work McDougal noted that though the global onler has 
no "centralized executive organ", sanctions, i.e., defined as "implementing techniques or available base values", 
are at the disposal of states or the general community of states for securing reasonable conformity in the conduct 
of states to inclusive [or community] prescriptions. 
138. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 710 (1974); such acts are not 
condemned by the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United States, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 
(1970). 
139. The extent to which a victor will assume the costs of restoring or assisting a former and defeated 
belligerent is a matter of judgment, coupled with the larger policy in imposing the terms of peace. According 
to Thomas C. Schelling, war is an instrument that involves bargaining, and the bargaining position of the rivals 
will depend upon the choices made, and the choices forces upon, each side: 
If war to the finish has become inevitable, there is nothing left but pure conflict; but if there is any 
possibility of avoiding a mutually damaging war, of conducting warfare in a way that minimizes damage, 
or of coercing an adversary by threatening war rather than waging it, the possibility of mutual 
acconuriodation is as important and dramatic as the element of conflict. Concepts like deterrence, 
limited war, and disarmament, as well as negotiation, are concerned with the common interest and 
mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a conflict ••• To study the strategy of conflict 
is to take the view that most conflict situations are essential bargaining situations. They are situations 
in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the 
choices or decisions that the other participant will make. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy ofConfJict 
5 (pbk ed., 1968). 
140. The citations and quotations used in the paper come from David H.N.Johnson, Rights in Airspace 
ch. 4 (1965). Professor Johnson provides the citations to the quotations. 
141. !d., at 45; if. Clausewitz, supra note 125, at 97, who stated that combat objectives were to destroy 
the military forces of the enemy, but to build upon this outcome to achieve political goals. 
142. Johnson cites Sir Arthur Harris to the effect that deaths from Allied bombing of Germany were 
305,000 and from the blockade in the First World War were 800,000. Johnson, supra note 140, at 53. 
143. ld., at 52. Churchill was clearly reflecting the experience of the aftermath of the first World War. 
Johnson notes that Sir Arthur Harris, in charge of the air command at the end of the war, had so accelerated 
the attacks on the cities that he was refused a peerage like other Service chiefS, and that the political figures, 
including Churchill, sought to turn away from him and his actions. 
144. Geneva Protocol,l., publication of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1977. 
Article 51. Other articles in Protocol I are supportive of this prohibition. Reprisals are forbidden. Cultural 
objects are protected, along with places of worship. See Part IV. 
145. See Meehan, supra note 116, at 226. Judgment "is somewhat amorphous, difficult to isolate, yet 
analytically necessary to account for human performance .•. Unfortunately, the only test of judgment is 
anotherjudgment, and ifinformedjudgments conflict, there is no way to resolve the difference pending further 
evidence of additional reasoning." 
146. The large number of Security Resolutions with regard to Iraq is an indication of the step-wise 
movement in the global community in imposing coercion through sanctions; although there is room to claim 
that the resolutions might permit the use of force, disputes exist between the United States and the Soviet 
Union as to the correct interpretation. Resolution 669 refers to preceding resolutions 660-662, 664, 666, and 
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 332 
667, :ill adopted in 1990, but spread over a four month's period. Past experience with the Security Council 
would suggest that if the use of force is to be directed, it must be expressed in blunt language, and therefore 
the states in the Council will leave none of the resolution to individual interpretation. 
147. The resolutions as adopted are set forth in the recendy initiated publication of the Department of 
State: DISPATCH. See those set forth in Vol. 1, Nos 2,4. At the time of writing this paper a resolution is 
being proposed that will pennit or direct the use offorce against Iraq. The operative language from Resolution 
661 (August 6, 1990) Dispatch 75 (September 10, 1990) states: 
rrhe Security Council] 4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of 
Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any 
other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their 
territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or 
to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or 
bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payment exclusively forstricdy medical or humanitarian purposes 
and in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffi. 
The expression "short of war" is ambiguous. States exercise a variety of measures applying or dependent 
upon coercion. When and how they finally go to war has become uncertain in global situations where most 
states would prefer to correct wrongs by force on an economical basis, but without the costs and incalculable 
risks of warfare. 
148. In U.S. Dept of State, Dispatch, September 10, 1990, p. 76. 
149. For an assessment of economic sanctions in general including those of peacetime, see Margaret P. 
Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (2d ed., 1980); Dilemmas of Economic Coercion 
217 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter WIlensteen, eds., 1983), observing that such sanctions must reach the political 
base, and the constitutive rules and ideology of a social order in order to be effective. M. S. Daoudi & M. S. 
Dajani, Economic Sanctions (1983), conclude that the sanctions do not work. Doxey summarizing Medlicott;s 
findings states that the five main fields of achievement in World War II were: 
1. The drastic limitation of German imports from nonEuropean sources, reduced after November 
1942 to the small, desperate contribution of the blockade runners; 2. The creation of encirclement 
neurosis with marked effect on German political and military strategy; 3. The direct hampering of the 
Axis armament effort by the creation of raw material shortages; 4. The indirect hampering of the Axis 
wartime economy by additional strains on transport and manpower; and 5. The strengthening of neutral 
resistance to Axis pressure by economic aid, by the constant evidence of Allied detennination, and by 
threats of reraIiation, immediate or delayed. Although the Allied effort in economic warfare undoub-
tedly had its effect in weakening Germany's war potential and capacity and contributed to her eventual 
defeat, it is not contended, or generally considered that it was a decisive factor at any stage. 
150. Uniting for Peace Resolution, November 3, 1950. G.A. Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
No.20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951). The General Assembly resolved to make recommendations for 
"collective measures" including the use of force "when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security." The International Court of Justice approved the resolution notwithstanding the provisions of 
the Charter conferring what amounted to exclusive jurisdiction on the Security Council as to these matters: 
Certain Expenses of The United Nations, [1962] I.CJ. 150. 
151. &e Colombos, supra note 88, at 836. 
152. The Budapest Articles oflnterpretation, quoted by Robert H. Jackson, supra note 36, 35 Am. J. Int'l 
L. at 355, indicate the shift of the attitudes toward neutrality that had occurred among states that accepted the 
articles at the time of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. They said in part: 
WHEREAS by their participation in the Pact sixty-three States have abolished the conception of 
war as a legitimate means of exercising pressure on another State in the pursuit of national policy and 
have also renounced any recourse to armed force for the solution of international disputes of conflicts: 
(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, release itself from 
its obligations thereunder; (2) a signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution 
of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact; (3) a signatory State which 
aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact; (4) in the event ofa violation of the Pact by a 
resort to armed force or war by one signatory State against another, the other States may, without 
thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International Law, do :ill or any of the 
following things: (a) refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent rights, 
such as visit and search, blockade, etc.; (b) decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the 
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duties prescribed by Intematioll2l Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral relation in relation to a 
belligerent; (c) supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance including munitions of 
war; (d) assist with armed forces the State attacked; (5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognize 
as acquired de jure any territorial or other advantages acquired de facto by means of a violation of the 
Pact; (6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a violation of the Pact 
to any signatory State or to its nationals; (7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as 
are contained in general treaties [naming the Geneva and Hague Conventions]. 
Though not approved by all states their impact is clear from the number that signed. 
153. The Inter-American Maritime Neutrality Convention, signed at Havana, February 20,1928, in Leon 
Friedman, 1 The Law ofWar 457 (1972) illustrates the tendency ofbelligerent practice and diplomatic practice 
to diverge, because it favors the neutral countries' over what the belligerents accept in their practice. Too large 
a gap between the law of the diplomats and the law that develops in practice leads ultimately to the former, 
or treaty law, being set aside. Cf. the experience of the arms control agreements where the United States 
Senate found the agreements were out of step with the perceptions of the State as to what best might assure 
the security of the United States. 
154. Ample examples exist of trends in the past in which treaties and agreements have been drafted and 
have never come into effect. The Dec1aration ofLondon, 1909, the Hague Rules on Air Warfare, the numerous 
treaties and conventions with limited duration, the Geneva Protocols of 19n, the Washington Conferences 
and the law they attempted to impose, and even in the related area of arms control the SALT and other 
agreements have provided us with instruments that could be negotiated, even signed, but never ratified. The 
Harvard Draft agreements on various aspects offorce: neutrality, piracy, and so on have been valuable for the 
study or inquiry into the existing law, but the law itself remains as in the past, largely the outcome of the 
practice of states. 
155. War may require deliberations, preparations and intelligence greater by far than that invoked in the 
past if the intention is to reduce the costs and burdens that inevitably arise. The Chinese strategist observed: 
War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival 
or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. 
Sun Tzu, supra note 134, at 63. The gloss on this maxim by another Chinese writer declared: 
Weapons are tools ofill omen. War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark upon 
it without reflection. 
Sun Tzu subsequently observed that "what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy," 
and by this he included the enemy's capabilities, thus providing under modem warfare the opportunities of 
economic warfare. Should the shift go to strategic attacks on cities, however, it would run afoul of the maxim 
to refrain from an attack on cities: "Attack cities only when there is no alternative." ld., at 77,78. Protracted 
warfare in itself, according to Sun Tzu, is a form of economic deprivation, ultimately undermining the capability 
ofrnaintaining the offensive or the attack. ld., at 72-74. Hence, 
Those unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops are equally unable to 
understand the advantageous ways of doing so ••• Those adept in waging war do not require a second 
levy of conscripts nor more than one provisioning. ld., at 73. 
156. The seizure of the crisis by the Security Council does not waive a state's claim to self defense or 
collective self defense: these call for separate, often differing perceptions as to threat and response. However, 
the Security Council's competence has a major impact upon neutrality when it does decide or act. 
Unfortunately, United Nations practice so far provides us with little in the way of useful content. The current 
Middle East Crisis indicates the difficulty in reaching appropriate resolutions to curtail the aggression ofIraq. 
157. According to McDougal and Feliciano: 
A sufficiently flexible test of the crucial intensity and scope [of violence or force under Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter] may be reached, we suggest, by considering the impact of the coercion exercised 
upon the expectation structure of the target state. In these tenns, the key effect is creation in the target 
state of reasonable expectations, as third party observers may determine reasonableness, that it must 
forthwith respond with exercises of military force if it is to maintain its primary values, customarily 
described as "territorial integrity and political independence." McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 8, 
at 200. 
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The widening denund to refr.Un from economic coercion appears in the guidelines laid down in the "Helsinki 
Accords," to wit, "To refr.Un from any act of economic coercion designed to subordinate to theirown interests 
the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages 
of any kind." Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, Aug. 1. 1975, 
rrprintetl in 12 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Similarly, see the duty of states to cooperate in the Declaration on Principles 
ofintemational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1970, rrprintetl in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970). 
158. On the prospects of air blockade see Lt. Thomas A. Vatallo, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc. 19 (December 
1990); he considers this modality of attack and also the general article by Adm E. W. Carter, on blockade, M., 
(November 1990), at 42-47. Vatallo argues from an operational perspective that "almost all the economic flow 
depends on the sea, and this will not change in the near future. Despite modem communications, however, 
nuny business transactions rely heavily on air travel. An effective air blockade could indirecdy affect a countty's 
economy, although in a less dramatic fashion that [sic, than?] a naval blockade." But he argues that the "more 
likely scenario" for such an air blockade is during "peacetime." 
159. The problem of "strategic deterrence" and ultinutely of "strategic defense" is one that embraces 
both peacetime actions to fend offfuture conflicts and the possibility of wartime attacks on strategic objectives. 
Economic methods ofwamre might better be identified as affirnutive actions or as reactive actions instead of 
referring to them as "offensive" or "defensive." 
160. An interesting problem arises here: who and under what circumstances decides the interpretation 
and application of the Security Council directives. Ambiguity is inherent in external affairs, created by states, 
if necessary, where their policies are to be served. 
161. The SALT agreements were ambiguous: submarine launched ballistic missiles are included as 
"strategic offensive weapons," and only the land-based weapons that reach the territory of the other state are 
included, but this becomes confusing because the agreement then limits such weapons to those with a range 
of5000 kilometers. 
162. Hence the Western countries were able to consider the espionage and industrial theft by the Soviet 
Union and other communist countries as unfriendly behavior during peacetime, subject to their criminal law, 
but are likely to treat such conduct as hostile behavior, subject to reprisals or other actions to counter them 
during wartime. 
163. &e the prefatory renurks to these conclusion. Discussion in the paper has not extended to the 
changing face of neutrality in depth. See McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 8, at ch. 5. The conditions 
leading to change but not certainty include: (1) a nujor change leading to community prohibitions against 
coercion and violence under all circumstances; (2) the organiution of the global community such that nude 
the community the objective of protection and limited the neutrality principle of impartiality so that 
discriminatory treatment could be afforded the victims of aggression, identified as members of a global order 
that was being impaired; (3) the rising expectations of the involved states as clainunts that resort is to be nude 
to collective security, and that security is to be protected from attack. Itl. at 397-400. 
164. Much of this conclusion is to be seen in the decisions at Nuremberg: subnurines were not declared 
even with an open attack campaign as engaged in illegal warfare; strategic bombing of cities and the use of the 
nuclear weapons were not condemned; substantial burning and destruction of the land under a scorched earth 
policy were not the subject of indictment. Broad, general principles were pronounced, but the application of 
principle, direcdy, or through rule, to the events does not appear. The crimes were vaguely stated: crimes 
against "peace;" crimes against "humanity;" and crimes of "aggression." 
165. The anticipatory law appears in Geneva Protocols of 19n, I.C.R.C., Geneva, 1977, especially in 
Protocol I where the ratitying states have undertaken to take steps to protect the natural environment, refrain 
from reprisals against it, to protect their own citizens by isolating them from major military targets, and so on. 
&e articles 35, 36, 55, 57, 58. Anticipatory law and general principles oflaw thus may provide the general 
guidelines, as was shown in the foremost of the principles that appeared in the deMartens Clause added to the 
Hague Convention IV of 1907. 
166. Cf. Myres S. McDougal, tt aI, in Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisnun, Power and Policy 
in Quest of Law 353 (1985); effective power, made authoritative, is a ubiquitous aspect of all social processes, 
an indispensable component ofJaw. While naked power rarely rears its head without some relation to authority, 
its presence and effect on decision must always be taken into account. The important fact is that it is effective 
power, taken as a whole and commonly comprised ofboth authority and control, that establishes and maintains 
processes of authoritative decision, both constitutive and public order, and hence affects the fundamental 
policies expressed in all law. 
167. Cf.Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 90 (1972): 
Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, 
whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of comnunica-
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tions, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it is 
rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of communications, but they are communications 
of the army alone, and not to the wider communications which are part of the life of the nation. 
This perspective, though enlarged by strategic economic warfare, based in part on sea platforms, contains an 
additional perspective: naval arms control for a state dependent upon communications and therefore command 
of the sea is entirely different from a land-based state like the Soviet Union in its interests and the needs ofits 
strategy. States that have command of the sea dispersing that command to others will be shifting from the 
stable equilibrium enjoyed to one of instability. Command of the sea is a complex question of targets, missions 
and responsibilities, weapons and sea platforms. See generally, Corbett, for his discussion of "commerce 
prevention" (used in place of "commerce destruction'1 as part of control of communications. But he says that 
battles are intended ultimately "to exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life." ld. at 94. 
168. Rules of engagement and operating principles have two features: the commander in the situation 
demanding action must act consistent with international law [and the rules to this end give him guidance], 
and that under the peacetime rules he must report immediately to higher authority and seek guidance prior 
to the use of armed force wherever practicable. See Annotated Supplement To The U.S. Department of the 
Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Commander's Handbook on The Law of Naval Operations, 
(NWP 9) (REV. A)/FMFM 1-10, 1987, at para. 3.1. [hereinqfter, Annotated Supplement] The rules are 
promulgated by the Joint ChiefS of Staff, see id., at para. 3.11.1. The distinction of peacetime and wartime 
rules are given in para. 5.5.1: 
[peacetime rules] provide the authority for and limitations on actions taken in self-defense during 
peacetime and periods short of prolonged armed conflict, for the defense ofU.S. forces, the self-defense 
of the nation and its citizens, and the protection of U.S. national assets worldwide. Wartime rules of 
engagement, on the other hand, reaffirm the right and responsibility of the operational commander 
generally to seek out, engage, and destroy enemy forces consistent with national objectives, strategy, 
and the law of armed conflict. 
Cf. J. Ashley Roach, Rules qfEngagement, Nav. War ColI. Rev. 43-53 (January - February 1983). 
And in para. 5.5 it is pointed out that the rules at a national or strategic level are promulgated to guide 
commanders in the use of force toward the achievement of broad national objectives; at the tactical level are 
"task oriented and frequently rnission-oriented:" 
At all levels, U.S. wartime rules of engagement are influenced by, and are consistent with, the law 
of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict provides the general framework within which U.S. rules 
of engagement during hostilities are formulated. Because rules of engagement also reflect operational, 
political and diplomatic factors, they often restrict combat operations far more than do the requirements 
of international law. 
But "a principal tenent of those ROE [i.e., peacetime] is the responsibility of the commander to take all 
necessary and appropriate action for his unit's self defense." Annotated Supplement, supra, at 4.3.2.2. 
169. For the use of a cost and risk calculus by Mao in his considerations for intervention to assist North 
Korea in the Korean War of 1950, see the two telegrams published in the N. Y. TImes, February 26, 1992, at 
A8. Mao advised Stalin that "we have decided to send part of the armed forces into Korea, under the title of 
Volunteer Army, to do combat with the forces of America." Mao insisted that this went to his vital interests, 
because if the Americans were to occupy all of Korea, it will be a disaster for "Korean revolutionary power." 
Mao then balanced out the chances and the necessities that would ensure those chances for success in terms 
of the military forces and equipments needed [he wanted four times the troop strength, and one and half to 
two times the fire power to oppose the American Eighth Army]. He would then include two backup armies 
for a "second and third wave of military forces to assist Korea." With these requirements met, "they will 
assuredly, cleanly and thoroughly destroy the one Army of the enemy." Mao in his telegram to Zhou Enlai 
stressed the political necessity, i.e., that this "active policy" would be "extremely advantageous for China, 
Korea and the world." And a failure to do so would be disadvantageous: 
In summation, we think we should enter the war, we must enter the war. Entering the war will 
have great benefits, and the harm inflicted by not entering the war would be great. 
170. As noted in the author's paper, supra n. 1, the conclusion that is reached is that of evolving law and 
evolving belligerent practice: 
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 336 
A5 wars intensifY with strikes or continuing attacks at a rival's economy, even these military strikes 
can be appraised as forms of economic warfare, because they reduce the capacity of the economy to 
sustain the war effort. But if this is done, such a switch in perspective would lead to new formulations 
of the conflict's objectives, most likely involving a switch from military to political formulae, and 
creating a tendency towards vagueness, ambiguity and uncertainty in their formulation. The perspec-
tives of the belligerents would lead away from the military strategies once non-military participants 
take control of the conflict, and away from the objectives that have traditionally been sought in armed 
conflict. [d. at 670. 
171. 1 Wmston Churchill, The War Speeches of the Rt. Hon. Wmston S. Churchill 300 (Charles Eade 
ed.,1953). 
